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Abstract
This thesis examines the political culture and behavior in South Carolina during
the secession crisis and first two years of the Civil War. Historians have analyzed
antebellum politics in South Carolina but few recent attempts have been made to trace
those issues to the larger narrative of state politics during the Civil War. I argue that
serious political divisions existed in the Palmetto State during the sectional crisis over
the proper method and procedure of secession. Once secession became a reality South
Carolina politicians attempted to bury these differences for the sake of unity, but
ultimately the pressures of war caused them to appear once again, thereby jeopardizing
the harmony and unity that so many politicians in the state hoped for. Secession itself
was an external revolution. Yet, another revolution occurred within the state as the war
progressed. This internal revolution took the form of an Executive Council that
essentially removed the governor of South Carolina from power. The entire experiment
represented a decisive departure from the state’s long political tradition and culture.
This study demonstrates that little agreement existed in South Carolina on the
nature of the external revolution. The establishment of a southern confederacy was
clearly the desired end, but the means to achieve this end differed widely in the state.
More fundamentally, little unanimity existed on the nature of the proposed southern
nation. South Carolina politicians could not come to an ideological agreement on what
this revolution was about. Not only was South Carolina the only state in the
Confederacy to seriously debate the merits of the Confederate Constitution, but it was
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the only state whose secession convention was still in existence two years after leaving
the Union.
The result was a lengthy and bitter dispute over the sovereign powers of the
convention. Because the actions of the Executive Council were extraordinary, they
created an internal revolution within the state. This revolution moved in a direction that
nobody quite anticipated. The constitutional functioning of state government was
temporarily suspended to meet the exigencies of war. Since the council was a creature of
the convention, many came to question the legitimacy of both the council and
convention. Eventually the people of South Carolina reacted against them so that the
state might return to “constitutional government.”
Yet, for all the division and disagreement that existed, the Executive Council is
not an indication of fleeting morale, willpower, or general disillusionment with the war.
Instead, it is an expression of Confederate nationalism. The story of the convention and
council indicate that South Carolinians were willing to temporarily sacrifice many of
their political and cultural values to achieve independence.
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Introduction
Confederate politics has certainly not been neglected by historians. Legislation
coming out of the Confederate Congress, its relationship to President Davis, what those
relationships say about Confederate nationalism, morale, and willpower, has been
analyzed in detail by scholars who study the American Civil War. Unfortunately, the
political history of South Carolina during the Civil War has received inadequate attention
in recent years. In 1950 Charles Cauthen wrote an excellent book on this very subject and
it remains the most comprehensive study to this day. But the state that inaugurated
secession and proposed the creation of a southern confederacy deserves a re-evaluation in
light of the studies that have appeared since that time. Several excellent monographs exist
that deal with the nature of antebellum South Carolina politics but few attempts have
been made to connect those issues to the larger story of the Civil War.
This study attempts to bridge that gap. It argues that serious political divisions
were created from the sectional crisis that developed in the state over the proper method
and procedure of secession. The roots of secession in South Carolina were firmly in place
by 1860. Yet, the political disparity over how and when to bring about secession created
lasting factions that did not die once South Carolina made its bid for independence.
Palmetto State politicians attempted to bury these differences for the sake of unity but
ultimately the pressures of war caused these divisions to re-emerge and created an
internal revolution within the state that nobody quite anticipated. The end result was a
political experiment that constituted a decisive departure from South Carolina’s
antebellum political tradition and culture.

Lengthy debates ensued in the legislature and state convention over fundamental
questions involving the nature of the proposed Confederacy. South Carolina’s delegation
to the Montgomery convention was hopelessly divided over what kind of government
should be created. Robert Barnwell Rhett had a fixed vision of a southern confederacy
that never came to be. Other members of the South Carolina delegation wanted
provisions included in the Permanent Constitution that were soundly rejected by the other
southern states. Nearly all of the resolutions offered by South Carolina were defeated at
the Montgomery convention. When ratification of the Permanent Constitution was
debated in the state convention another bitter debate ensued between the cooperationists
and radicals. No other state in the Confederacy debated the merits of the Confederate
Constitution as extensively as South Carolina. The radicals seemed determined to push
ahead with the revolution they had done so much to create. The moderates, in turn, tried
to stop the revolution from spinning out of control. The revolution did go on, but in 1862
it moved in a direction that did not entirely please either faction. The internal revolution
that occurred in South Carolina during the second year of the war threatened to unravel
and expose serious divisions all politicians hoped to eliminate for the sake of victory and
independence.
Nevertheless, this disagreement should not be interpreted as a rejection of the
Confederacy. On the contrary, South Carolina gave the Confederacy its unrelenting
support during the first two years of the war. In fact, even before the Confederate
Congress passed Conscription Acts and threatened the central tenet of states’ rights,
South Carolina had already embarked on a extensive program of state centralization that
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impinged on the individualism and local autonomy that South Carolinians had held so
dear during the antebellum era.
The leadership of Governor Francis Pickens in 1861, or perhaps more accurately,
the lack of leadership, resulted in South Carolina experimenting with politics that were
unknown in the antebellum period. Pickens controlled the state and made the military
decisions in 1861. His failure to secure the South Carolina from federal assaults on the
coast resulted in a silent coup that essentially removed him from power. After the fall of
Port Royal in November and the Great Fire of Charleston in December 1861, the state
convention was reassembled at the request of President David F. Jamison and it
proceeded to create an Executive Council that usurped the powers of both the governor
and legislature. Throughout 1862 South Carolina had a dual government: a governor and
legislature elected under the constitution of 1790 and an Executive Council elected by the
Convention of the People. The council functioned as an arm of the convention and
assumed both an executive and legislative role. The legislature, technically still the legal
law-making body under the constitution, was temporarily relegated to a position of
unimportance. Governor Pickens was essentially replaced as Commander-in-Chief by
James Chesnut Jr., who became Chief of the Department of the Military, and the
Executive Council exercised extraordinary powers that were granted by the convention to
take charge of state affairs and put South Carolina on a more permanent war-footing. The
legislature, which had adjourned in December 1861, did not meet again until December
of 1862. When it did meet, the legislature promptly repealed all measures taken by the
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council and disbanded that body so that the state might return to “Constitutional
Government.”
The measures taken by the Executive Council were nothing short of
revolutionary. Manufacturing was increased to proportions unknown in the antebellum
days. Relief was provided to displaced citizens and provisions made to ease the suffering
of the poor. That state politics was fundamentally altered by the council can hardly be
doubted. By all indications the council not only went about its work with considerable
energy but also produced tangible results. In a very real sense the Executive Council was
an expression of Confederate nationalism. But the council also aroused fierce resentment
over what many considered to be arbitrary measures and abuses of power. Charges were
made that the council was legislating and acting as an executive body at the same time,
which, of course, was true. This breech of the separation of powers stirred an opposition
movement that eventually resulted in the dissolution of the convention and council. In
other words, proper constitutional procedure was still important to South Carolinians.
Although the lines of factionalism in the antebellum era were not as clear cut on
this issue over the Executive Council, one can detect lingering discontent that was
reminiscent of earlier days. It was said that the council was created out of necessity, that
the exigencies of war required a stronger executive department, and yet, the entire
episode illustrates the limits as to how far the people were willing to go to secure victory.
Contradictions abounded and the process of resolving the paradoxical nature of state
politics during a time of war was not easy. Sharp disagreement over the powers and
sovereignty of the convention mirrored the differences of an earlier time.
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In the end, the council’s downfall came about because a majority of South
Carolinians were unwilling to forfeit all the basic tenets that were fundamental to the
constitutional functioning of state government. They were willing to make sacrifices but
they could not continue them indefinitely. Although the Confederacy never developed
anything resembling political parties, the Executive Council of 1862 is a fine illustration
of how factionalism came to take the place of parties. There were radicals and moderates
who supported the council just as there were radicals and moderates who opposed it. It
cannot be said that the council was the creation of any particular faction but it does
demonstrate there were definite limitations on the departure of past political practice
these groups would allow. South Carolinians were willing to accept temporary changes to
its state government for the sake of victory. The creation of the Executive Council was a
product of the war. There can be little doubt that the council was created because South
Carolina politicians were uncertain of victory. The war was not unfolding in a way that
most South Carolinians imagined it would. Military necessity became the watchword of
the day and the council was justified under this ground. Yet, the state’s long political
tradition could not simply be swept away. The tensions and debates stemming from these
political questions created an internal atmosphere that all of South Carolina politicians
wanted to avoid. The reality of war made it unavoidable.
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Chapter One
Prelude to Secession: The Sectional Crisis in South Carolina
Southern nationalism came early to South Carolina. There is something to be said
for placing its origins during the Nullification crisis when antidemocratic and proslavery
discourse began to form the theoretical foundation of southern nationalism.1 To be sure,
Nullification was a divisive episode that did much to exacerbate the political and social
gulf between planter and yeoman. Planters too became divided among themselves over
basic assumptions about the exercise of political power and the proper relation between
the state and federal government. Ideological and theoretical questions regarding the
sovereignty of state conventions appeared during this time and there was no little
disagreement on the question of how much power a state convention possessed. Was a
state convention limited in its sovereignty? How long could a convention be in session?
Could a convention legislate? Was a convention “the people” acting in their highest
sovereign capacity, or was a convention merely a representative body called for a specific
purpose and limited in its power by the state constitution? Not surprisingly, these difficult
and complex questions were not answered definitively by South Carolina politicians.
Over thirty years later in 1862, when South Carolina was in the midst of a civil war, these
questions would again come to the surface and produce a bitter debate that threatened to
tear apart the political fabric of the state.
Paradoxically, for all the divisiveness that Nullification produced it also
crystallized South Carolina planter politicians’ commitment to slavery and southern
1

Manisha Sinha, The Counter Revolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina
(Chapel Hill, NC.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 33.
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nationalism. The failure of those who advocated unionism helped to prevent a viable
political opposition to the proslavery and separatist discourse championed by the
nullifiers. Democratic reform and political dissent was checked as the South Carolina
state government retained a largely undemocratic structure.2 In antebellum South
Carolina, the legislature was the keystone of the state’s political system. The legislature,
not “the people,” elected the governor, presidential electors, United States Senators, and a
plethora of important local officers. This system gave disproportionate power to the
legislature and ran against the grain of Jacksonian democracy and acted as a barrier to the
creation of a two-party system in the state. It was not that Jacksonian democracy
completely bypassed South Carolina but its form took a different shape. As Lacy Ford
explains, there were “important idiosyncrasies, differences which placed South Carolina
defiantly out of the national Jacksonian mainstream.…South Carolina had all the energy
of grassroots democracy but none of the chains of the Jacksonian party system, a
combination which proved to be a fine prescription for radicalism.”3
This prescription proved useful to South Carolina planter politicians as sectional
tensions began to deepen over the country’s Manifest Destiny. On August 8, 1846,
Pennsylvania Democrat David Wilmot offered an amendment to an appropriations bill
stipulating that any territory acquired by the United States from Mexico as a result of
peace negotiations be required to prohibit the institution of slavery. The Wilmot Proviso
became a central issue in national politics because it fueled the sectional debate not only
2

Sinha, Counter Revolution of Slavery, 60-61; for an alternative view that argues antebellum South
Carolina was fiercely democratic at the grassroots level, see Lacy K. Ford Jr., Origins of Southern
Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry 1800-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
3
Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 143-44.
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over slavery in the territories, but also over slavery where it already existed. Reaction in
the Palmetto state was swift and immediate. Throughout 1847-1848 mass meetings and
public rallies were held across the state denouncing the Wilmot Proviso as “a gratuitous
insult to the South.” Even the lifelong Unionist and South Carolina moderate Benjamin
F. Perry drafted a set of resolutions at a public meeting in Greenville vowing to resist the
proviso “at all hazards and to the last extremity.” He went on to warn that adoption of
the proviso would create “alarming and imminent peril” which would hang over “the
institutions and sovereign rights of the slaveholding states.”4 Public gatherings and
private correspondence indicate the almost complete unanimity on the reaction to
Wilmot’s amendment.5 Fear and suspicion soon gripped the state and by May 1849
twenty-nine local committees had gathered in Columbia to establish a Central Committee
of Vigilance and Safety which acted as a quasi-official advisory body to the governor. By
early summer almost every district in the state had endorsed resolutions pledging to resist
any further attacks on the institution of slavery.6
The ferocity of South Carolina’s defense of slavery and opposition to the Wilmot
Proviso can be traced to the political thinking of John C. Calhoun, who had by this time
fully developed the doctrine that slavery could not be excluded from a territory prior to
its admission to statehood. This theory took shape in a set of resolutions Calhoun
introduced in the Senate on February 19, 1847. In its essentials, Calhoun argued that the

4

Lillian Adele Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry: South Carolina Unionist (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press,
1946), 240.
5
Lacy K. Ford Jr., Origins of Southern Radicalism, 186; David Duncan Wallace, The History of South
Carolina (New York: The American Historical Society, 1934), Vol. III, 118; Walter Edgar, South
Carolina: A History (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 341.
6
Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 187-88.
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territories were the common property of the states, and therefore, citizens of any given
state had the same constitutional rights to take their property into the common territories.
Any discrimination against the property rights of the citizens of various states would be a
violation of the Constitution.7 Often referred to as the “Calhoun Doctrine,” South
Carolinians fanatically defended this political theory which would become the basis for
the southern political platform throughout the sectional crisis.8
If the Nullification episode provided the origins for a nascent southern
nationalism, the territorial crisis of 1846-1850 solidified the conception. Although South
Carolina had never developed a strong two-party system in the antebellum era, it was
during these critical years, particularly the election of 1848, when South Carolina
politicians began to disassociate their state from national political parties more than ever
before.9 Manisha Sinha has persuasively argued that the discourse of southern
nationalism was firmly grounded in the defense of racial slavery. Formal constitutional
and political arguments were of secondary importance compared to “the vindication of
slavery as a superior way of ordering society and of a separate identity based on slavery,”
which would “constitute the discourse of southern nationalism.” It was the desire to
expand slavery into the territories which augmented the idea of southern nationalism. For
Sinha, the desire stemmed from a strong belief among southern leaders in the proslavery
argument, while the discourse of proslavery politics “provided the ideological coherence

7

David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 59-60.
Sinha, The Counter Revolution of Slavery, 70-71.
9
N.W. Stephenson, “Southern Nationalism in South Carolina in 1851,” The American Historical Review,
36, 2, (Jan., 1931), 314-35.
8
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and unity to southern nationalism.”10 Sinha’s view carries a considerable degree of
credibility. However, Emory Thomas reminds us that “nationalism is a compound of
many interdependent elements. In the Old South a unique social economy combined with
a distinctive “mind,” religious spirit, life style, and culture to produce a nascent
nationalism.”11 In other words, southern nationalism was a nebulous conception
composed of many different elements all revolving around a loosely defined “southern
way of life.” Thomas’s idea that the “cause” began as a deeply rooted ideology which
provided the theoretical basis for a southern nation is more pertinent to this study. In
South Carolina, ideology shaped government more than anything else. The southern
nationalism that developed early in South Carolina can be partly explained as a reaction
to the attacks on slavery from outside the state.
After the Wilmot Proviso was introduced, South Carolina politicians split into two
factions and were in serious disagreement over the best strategies and tactics to defend
slavery and southern society. One group of conservative politicians tended to be more
nationally orientated, complaining that Calhoun was keeping South Carolina out of the
national mainstream. This group consisted primarily of old Unionists such as Benjamin F.
Perry and James L. Petigru and moderate politicians like James L. Orr who believed that
slavery could be best defended through existing party ties. The other group was far more
radical, consisting of ambitious men such as Robert Barnwell Rhett and Laurence M.
Keitt who urged more aggressive and audacious defiance of the federal government. The
radical faction had little qualms about taking South Carolina out of the Union if need be.
10
11

Sinha, Counter Revolution of Slavery, 63-64.
Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (New York, Harper & Row, 1979), 28.
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Calhoun was caught in the middle and criticized by both factions. Yet, it was Calhoun
who held the political center together, and as long as Calhoun remained alive he could
keep the opposing forces in check. Once Calhoun died (March 31, 1850) however, all the
issues surrounding the Compromise of 1850 generated an internal debate in state politics
that almost took South Carolina out of the Union. South Carolina entered the most critical
decade of the sectional crisis “in a state of political turmoil and without the constraint of
party fetters to help calm her.” The result was the first secession crisis which produced
“the most vigorous and divisive political campaigns since the nullification crisis and
revealed how even strategic and tactical disagreements over Southern rights could nearly
tear the state apart.”12
The Nashville Convention and the first secession crisis in South Carolina have
been described in detail by others.13 While the factional debates and political alignments
that ensued in the legislature over the crisis are fascinating, it is inexpedient to fully trace
their development here. It suffices to say the legislature passed an act to call a state
convention “with the view and intention of arresting further aggressions, and if possible
of restoring the Constitutional rights of the South.” If these rights were not restored, said
the legislature, the bill would provide “due provision for their future safety and
independence.”14 It seemed that the radicals were having their way and bringing the state
ever closer to disunion. However, serious disagreements over how best to provide “future

12

Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 183-84, quote at 184.
For an older but still excellent study on this movement, see Philip M. Hamer, The Secession Movement in
South Carolina 1847-1852 (Allentown, PA.: H. Ray Haas & Co., 1918).
14
Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, passed in December, 1850 (Columbia, SC.:
From the Steam-Power Press of I.C. Morgan, State Printer, 1850), 55-57.
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safety and independence” quickly surfaced. There soon developed two competing
factions between “separate state actionists” and “cooperationists.”
This factional split is important because the radicals, or “fire-eaters,” created the
atmosphere of secession, generated excitement over it, and provided the framework of
debate. Rhett, for example, told delegates at the Nashville Convention (June 1850) that a
slave society “must rule themselves or perish.” He was already convinced that there was
only “one course left, for the peace and salvation of the South, a dissolution of the
Union.”15 The radicals seemed to operate on the assumption that only separate and
immediate action by South Carolina would bring about a program of southern unity.
Once South Carolina left the Union, the radicals thought, other southern states would
surely stand with her. The radicals’ primary objective was to stir up agitation for
immediate secession with the least amount of discussion possible.
At the other end of the spectrum were the cooperationists led by James L. Orr of
Anderson district. This faction had an earnest desire to defend slavery and southern
rights, but they wanted to do so within the Union if possible. They would certainly
choose slavery over Union if the choice was forced upon them, yet Orr and many of his
followers had not given up entirely on the Union. Orr believed, like Calhoun, that a
successful defense of slavery could only come about from a plan of southern unity.
Robert W. Barnwell, a cooperationist and politician who had served South Carolina in
various public offices since 1826, agreed and thought “the policy now avowed and
zealously pressed into execution, of exciting South Carolina into a separate nation, seems
15

William C. Davis, RHETT: The Turbulent Life and Times of a Fire-Eater (Columbia, SC.: University of
South Carolina Press, 2001), 274, 278.
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to me so wide a departure from our past course, and so fraught with danger to the
institution which we all desire to defend, that I cannot refrain from expressing…my
earnest dissent from it.” 16 Clearly, South Carolina’s most prominent politicians were
divided over the best way to protect slavery.
The first secession crisis in South Carolina produced personal bitterness and
political wounds that would not heal quickly. The crisis had exhausted state politicians
and South Carolinians were emotionally drained from the five year struggle. The
cooperationists won the debate over immediate and separate secession because the
majority of South Carolina citizens thought it was unwise to leave the Union alone. Fear
of an internal slave insurrection, financial and commercial considerations, and a belief
that the federal government would use force to keep the state in the Union seem to have
been the primary reasons for rejecting separate state action.17 This does not mean,
however, that a strong Unionist sentiment prevailed throughout the state.
Indeed, nearly all South Carolina planter politicians had been in favor of
secession, but there was disagreement on the method and proper procedure. Nevertheless,
there was little disagreement on the constitutional right of a state to secede. When the
state convention convened in the spring of 1852 the vast majority of secessionists and
cooperationists passed a resolution confirming the right of secession by a vote of 136 to
19. Of those dissenting were B.F. Perry and a few other Unionists along with the most
extreme fire-eaters such as Maxcy Gregg who were disgusted with what they considered
16

Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Movement in South Carolina 1847-1852, 94-95; Ford, Origins
of Southern Radicalism, 195-99; Henry H. Lesesne, “Robert Woodward Barnwell,” in The South Carolina
Encyclopedia, Walter Edgar, ed., (Columbia, SC.: The University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 50-51;
Barnwell quote is in the Charleston Courier, May 27, 1851.
17
Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 209-10.
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a pointless resolution and a course of action that translated into “absolute submission.”18
The blueprints for secession had been drawn. The entire episode had been characterized
by internal political factionalism. Ironically, factionalism co-existed with a spirit of unity
over the right of South Carolina to secede. This trend where both factions agreed on the
ends but disagreed over the means would continue up to 1860 and beyond.
Meanwhile, national events continued to fester. The passage of the KansasNebraska Act in 1854 broke the relative calm in the state regarding the question over
slavery in the territories. The act essentially repealed the Missouri Compromise by
opening territories north of the 36 degrees thirty minutes to slavery. South Carolina
accepted the repeal cheerfully and sent some 250-400 men to settle the Kansas territory in
the hope of establishing a proslavery government. The majority of South Carolina
politicians saw the passage of the act as a triumph for Calhoun’s co-property doctrine,
which viewed any congressional restriction of slavery as unconstitutional. But the
passage of the act resulted in some unintended consequences that would only exacerbate
the growing sectional tension. The most obvious result of this was the creation of the
Republican Party which pledged to exclude slavery from all territories and represented
the most serious challenge to the perpetuation of slavery. An armed race quickly ensued
to win Kansas for freedom or slavery by ballots, or if need be, by bullets. The ideological
underpinnings were important to South Carolina as Kansas became the outpost for
slavery, and therefore, to the South for white civilization. This renewal of sectional

18

Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 211.
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antagonism gave the radicals like Rhett and Maxcy Gregg another opportunity to push
ahead with their agenda for secession and the creation of a southern confederacy.19
While radicals in South Carolina continued to push ahead with their plans to
secede and possibly form a southern confederacy, politics in the state went on as usual.
The economic and political tensions throughout the 1850’s did not result in anything
resembling a “revolution” in state politics. The legislature continued to play the dominant
role in policy-making and the governor of the state retained his nominal and largely
ceremonial position as chief executive. However, throughout the 1850’s fierce debates in
the legislature over representative apportionment, transportation, commerce, and
industry, threatened the political harmony that the state had long taken pride in. At times
these issues became explosive and “usually centered around fundamental disagreements
over what role state and local governments should play in sponsoring or sanctioning
economic development.”20
Yet, even these volatile issues did little to change the basic structure of state
government. Efforts at legislative reapportionment met with limited success. The only
concession the black-belt districts were willing to give to the white majority in the
Upstate was the division of Pendleton district into two new districts, Anderson and
Pickens. This compromise did little to solve the inequities in representation and the
parishes continued to control state politics to a considerable degree.21 Although railroads

19

Wallace, History of South Carolina,138-39; Sinha, Counter Revolution of Slavery, 127, 221.
Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 280.
21
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began to appear in the countryside and cotton producers became more firmly entrenched
in the market economy, neither this development nor political agitation in the legislature
over democratic reform resulted in any fundamental change to the political culture within
South Carolina.
Yet, under the surface, important but subtle changes to South Carolina’s political
culture were taking place. Ever since the Wilmot Proviso South Carolinians increasingly
doubted the ability of the national Democratic Party to protect the South’s interests. By
the time the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed Congress, the foundations for southern
nationalism were already laid in South Carolina.22 When the proslavery Lecompton
Constitution in Kansas was defeated in Congress, the radicals’ pointed out they had been
right all along, that national parties could not be trusted, and that the best way for South
Carolina to protect her interests was to pursue an independent course. The strategy the
radicals’ pursued was one of fear and propaganda. The election of 1860 would be the
deciding factor. The Mercury predicted “We deem it almost certain that within less than
two years all true men in South Carolina or at Washington will stand together. At all
events this is our hope. So strong is our conviction of the steady progress and fatal
purposes of the powerful Black Republican faction, that this is our belief.”23

Senate and were over-represented in the House, although the inland districts did have a majority in the
lower chamber. Nevertheless, planter politicians from the Lowcountry continued to dominate the
legislature and exert considerable influence, particularly in separatist politics.
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Hindsight tells us the Mercury was correct in its prediction. Yet, the large middle
ground between the extreme States’ Rights Party and the moderate National Democrats
continued to gain ascendancy during this time of uncertainty. The death of A.P. Butler
left a United States Senate seat vacant. On the third ballot James Henry Hammond was
elected as a compromise candidate. Hammond’s success was curious. He appealed to the
radicals but soon disappointed them by allying himself with the moderates. Throughout
the summer of 1858 Hammond thought the best policy for the state was to remain in the
Union and control the federal government through the cooperation of other southern
states. This alarmed the radicals who saw the defeat of the Lecompton Constitution as
absolute proof that the National Democratic Party was unreliable when it came to
protecting southern interests. According to Drew Faust, the South Carolina legislators
“may have viewed Hammond as a convenient means of satisfying popular demands
without posing any real threat.” The Charleston Evening News claimed Hammond was
“the people’s candidate.” His election “represented a new spirit in Carolina politics-a
reinstatement of older values and a rejection of the techniques of demagoguery and
electioneering that had in recent years made such remarkable inroads in the state.”24
The comment from the Charleston Evening News is instructive on the political
culture of South Carolina. George Rable has convincingly argued “the South’s dilemma
was primarily political, and whatever it’s economic and cultural effects, secession was a
political decision- a decision shaped by the region’s political traditions but also by recent
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and painful experience.” The “recent and painful experience” was not limited to northern
attacks on slavery. Indeed, many South Carolina planter politicians were becoming
disillusioned with perceived defects in the entire political process. Rable explains that
“cries against demagoguery and spoilsmen originated in ancient fears of political
corruption. Reservations about democracy-notably the “tyranny of numbers”- along with
worries about the security of both liberty and property contributed to this dissatisfaction.”
The ultimate fear, then, was that the political corruption which had so tainted the northern
states and the nation’s capital would overwhelm southern honor and liberty. Secession, it
was presumed, was the only way to avoid political contamination by establishing a
“moral quarantine.”25
The need to avoid contamination and begin some vague and undefined process of
political purification became even more urgent after John Brown raided the federal
arsenal at Harper’s Ferry Virginia. Brown’s raid was the capstone of a series of events
that generated fear and moved the state ever closer to secession. Reaction to Brown’s raid
across the state was convulsive. In the Upstate the Keowee Courier laid the blame
squarely on the shoulders of the Republican Party, claiming that the “vile clamor of party,
the struggle of Republicanism for power, has given an impetus to the abolitionist zeal of
old Brown and his comrades, that impelled them forward in their mad career of treason
and bloodshed.” In Spartanburg, the Carolina Spartan expressed regret at the “morbid
feeling and fanaticism” which exists in certain parts of the North. And in the
Lowcountry, the Charleston Courier uttered sympathy for the citizens of Virginia who
25
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had not yet recovered from the “civil war” that had engendered “their peaceful
community.” Not surprisingly, the harshest words were expressed by the Mercury, which
referred to the entire affair as a “small eruption on the surface of a diseased body” and
warned that “large portions of the North are our enemies.” It went on to predict that “The
Harper’s Ferry affair was but premature fruit. A whole harvest of sterner rebellion and
bloodier collision is growing up and ripening from the seed these men have sown.”26
Clearly, the newspapers across the state summarily denounced Brown’s raid and spread
fear that the raid was but the first of a series of attempts to bring a race war to the
South.27
More important was the reaction by the state legislature. Governor William H.
Gist’s message to the legislature that December was openly disunionist in tone. After
rhetorically asking the members whether South Carolina could rely on the Democratic
Party, he went on to say that if the South stood united “we could enforce equality in the
Union or maintain our independence out of it.” The legislature responded by introducing
sixteen radical resolutions in the House and several others in the Senate. Eventually the
legislature agreed upon a joint resolution stating that a meeting of the slave states should
be called immediately and that the governor should request other states to elect delegates;
that a special commissioner be sent to Virginia to express South Carolina’s sympathy and
reassure Virginia of the state’s desire to cooperate for the common defense; and finally
that $100,000 be appropriated for military contingencies. Vigilance committees were
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established at public meetings in nearly every community. These committees treated
anyone from the North or any stranger as suspect. Violence was the primary means of
driving suspicious individuals from the state. In addition, the General Assembly passed
several laws clearly meant to intimidate outsiders from visiting South Carolina. These
drastic actions were driven by a sense of fear that abolitionists were slowly making their
way into the slaveholding communities and homes of South Carolina and that the masterslave relationship might be in jeopardy after John Brown’s raid.28
Although John Brown’s raid did much to rally the radical faction in the state, the
radicals had already decided back in March of 1859 to launch a campaign that would
prevent South Carolina from being represented at the National Democratic convention at
Charleston in May 1860. The arguments advanced by the radicals were essentially the
same ones they had used in 1856. The Democratic Party, asserted the radicals, was
hopelessly divided on issues dear to the South and as a result could not be trusted to
protect southern interests. The national convention met on April 23 but did not go as
James Orr planned. It quickly became apparent that the convention was divided between
two very different schools of thought regarding the interpretation of the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. A showdown between the forces led by Stephen A. Douglas on the
one hand and those led by William L. Yancey of Alabama on the other soon consumed
much of the debate in the convention. Because popular sovereignty was a vague formula
that could be interpreted in many ways, disagreement between the opposing
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interpretations divided the convention.29 The Mercury constantly criticized the
convention and complained that “If the National Democratic Party cannot stand the test
of principle, matters on which the destiny of the South depends, let us have a sectional
party that can. Let the Convention break up.”30 Clearly, Rhett and the radicals wished to
disrupt the convention to guarantee a Republican victory, thereby creating a crisis in
which the South would be left no choice but to secede.31
Rhett and the radicals got their wish. When the southern platform was defeated,
thirteen of South Carolina’s delegates followed Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana out
of the convention hall.32 The Mercury congratulated the southern states that withdrew
from the convention and assured them “they are free of this ignoble struggle.” Not
coincidently, the paper went on to reprint a speech by Calhoun that warned against
forging ties with political parties of the North.33 The unity that Orr and the National
Democrats had so eagerly hoped for remained elusive.
With the National Democrats politically fractured there was a discernable trend
towards disunion throughout the summer and fall. W.W. Boyce wrote on August 3 that if
Lincoln was elected, all the southern states should withdraw from the Union. If they
choose not to do so, then South Carolina should secede alone “in the promptest manner,
and by the most direct means.” Boyce considered “the success of the Republican party in
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the Presidential election as involving the necessity of revolution.”34 These views were
echoed by the state legislature, Governor Gist, and every single member of the South
Carolina delegation in the federal House of Representatives. Outspoken radicals such as
Laurence M. Keitt argued that the Republicans, once they were in control of national
politics, would do everything in their power to destroy slavery. John McQueen lost hope
that Lincoln would be defeated and recommended immediate action by South Carolina.
William Porcher Miles from Charleston threw caution to the wind and epitomized the
radicals’ impatience when he complained to James Henry Hammond, “Let us act if we
mean to act without talking.” In a letter reprinted in the Charleston Courier, Hammond
thought that “there never was a sounder policy than at this time.” Even the cautious
James L. Orr, leader of the National Democrats in South Carolina, began to change his
mind. He wanted secession to be cooperative but admitted that living under Republican
rule was impossible. If the South cooperated in a program of secession then “no Black
Republican President shall ever execute any law within our borders unless at the point of
the bayonet and over the dead bodies of her slain sons.” By all calculations, it was Orr’s
influence that helped unify the state on a program of secession. At the end of August,
those opposing secession were squarely in the minority.35
Why South Carolina came to a general agreement on the question of secession
during the summer of 1860 is not entirely clear. There can be little doubt that the two
opposing political factions moved closer together after the convention moved to
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Richmond. This can be partly explained in terms of leadership. It appears most leaders
thought that the election of a Republican would mean secession in one form or another. A
more likely explanation can be found in the propaganda material circulating throughout
the state in 1860. The political leadership of the state had been preparing South Carolina
for the issues in 1860 for the past thirty years. A healthy dose of indoctrination in the
principles of states’ rights and educating the populace of the necessity of secession under
certain circumstances seemed to have paid off. The rhetoric stemming from this
propaganda was hardly new, but it took a more cohesive form in 1860. Certainly the
press contributed its fair share to the excitement and wisdom of secession, which is not to
say that all the newspapers agreed with each other on every issue, but almost without
exception their editors were “sound” in the doctrine of secession and in increasing
number counseled resistance as the probability of Lincoln’s election grew in the summer
and fall of 1860. Eventually, every newspaper in the state agreed that secession was
necessary.36
Less obvious but equally important was the political pamphlet. A group of
Charleston secessionists organized “The 1860 Association” in September. There can be
no question that the material produced by the association was meant to strike fear into the
citizenry. John Townsend wrote tract No. 4 entitled The Doom of Slavery in the Union:
Its Safety Out Of It. As the title makes clear, his thesis was that the Republicans would
not stop at anything until slavery was destroyed in the South. Townsend’s pamphlet
screamed that the South cannot “bend her neck to her enemies, and submit to have her

36

Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 31-33.

23

millions of slaves emancipated, her thousands of millions of property taken away from
her, her citizens reduced to poverty and want, a servile and debased race elevated to an
equality with her citizens, and their families degraded by such an inter course.”37 The
non-slaveholders did not escape the attention of those writing political pamphlets. Tract
No. 5, entitled The Interest of Slavery of the Southern Non-slaveholder, written by James
D. B. DeBow, essentially reinforced what the slaveholding class in the state had been
saying for years. The non-slaveholder, DeBow argued, had an even greater stake in the
institution than the slaveholder for slavery had produced a high number of property
owners who profited either directly or indirectly from the institution. Most important,
emancipation would bring with it equality and a race war from which poor whites would
be unable to escape.38
References to a race war bring a social dimension into the secession equation.
Steven Channing’s important study of secession in South Carolina underscores this
critical dimension. Channing has argued that secession “was the product of logical
reasoning within a framework of irrational perception.” This perception can be seen in
the words of James Henry Hammond who drafted a letter to the South Carolina
legislature asserting that the election of Abraham Lincoln was “no mere political or
ethical conflict, but a social conflict in which there is to be a war of races, to be waged at
midnight with the torch, the knife, & poison.” As this scenario was not frightening
enough, Baptist minister James Furman added to the fear when he prophesized that it
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would only be a matter of time before abolitionist preachers would be readily available
“to consummate the marriage of your daughters to black husbands.” For Channing, “the
conclusion is inescapable that the multiplicity of fears revolving around the maintenance
of race controls for the Negro was not simply the prime concern of the people of South
Carolina in their revolution, but was so very vast and frightening that it literally
consumed the mass of lesser “causes” of secession which have inspired historians.”39
Channing’s argument that secession was primarily a means to secure race control is well
taken. Still, as Rable noted, secession was essentially a political decision. If controlling
the black population in South Carolina was the primary concern of planter politicians, its
political manifestation was realized in the act of secession.
The growing unity in the state on the question of secession can be seen in the fall
elections for the legislature. Once again, unity of purpose prevailed in the midst of
internal factionalism. The difference of opinion was not on the question of whether South
Carolina should secede, but if she should secede separately or with the cooperation of
other southern states. This was the same basic difference of opinion that had occurred
nearly ten years earlier in the first secession crisis. Generally speaking, candidates simply
had to pledge their support for a state convention in the event Lincoln was elected
president. Only in a few cases were the candidates asked for specifics on their position.40
When this did occur, their positions were so similar that little can be found to
differentiate between them. In Yorkville, nearly all candidates agreed “The Black
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Republicans seemed fatally bent on extirpating slavery” and South Carolina must
“manfully resist or incur the disgrace of submission.”41 This type of rhetoric was
generally representative of the campaign across the state. The Mercury did not relent on
its criticism of those who were still hoping to keep the Union together. It charged that
those “vacillating, timid, wait-and-watch politicians have neglected the great essential
principles of our Southern Institutions” and accused them of “personal aggrandizement,
to secure favor, office, and banking money power.” The South should stand guard against
all “enemies North, and Traitors South.”42 If some politicians thought the Union should
be preserved, their voices were easily drowned out amidst the secessionist fervor that was
quickly sweeping across the state. In any case, the election resulted in a legislature that
was almost unanimously pledged to call a state convention if Lincoln was elected.43
When the legislature met in special secession on November 5, it seems that
cooperationist sentiment existed in the midst of strong secessionist feelings. The
differences of opinion were serious, but “they were not in any important degree the
disagreements of unionists and secessionists but rather lines of cleavage between sincere
cooperationists and separate actionists, between those who would have South Carolina
lead and those who preferred that South Carolina follow.”44 In other words, the
factionalism that existed did not mean disagreement over secession but only over the
proper method to follow. The Charleston Courier proudly claimed “There is now but one
sentiment, and that is that we must meet this forced issue with prompt resistance.” It went
41
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on to warn that “the enemy” stares South Carolina in the face and “we must either make
him surrender or he will complete our destruction.”45 Unity of purpose continued to
outweigh division on procedure.
As the legislature prepared to consider a convention bill a sharp battle ensued
over when the convention should meet. Numerous resolutions were offered. For Rhett,
the sooner the convention met the better. He suggested November 22, “in order that the
members might be home at election day.” But there was a far more important reason for
an early date, for longer the delay “the question would no longer be one of disunion, but
one of co-operation.”46 Rhett had little patience for waiting any longer on the rest of the
South; if other states choose to wait, then South Carolina should take the lead and act
alone. Frustration ensued for the radicals as A.P. Aldrich complained to James Henry
Hammond, “I do not believe the common people understand it, in fact I know they do not
understand it; but whoever waited for the common people when a great movement was to
be made. We must make the movement and force them to follow.”47
Eventually the date of the convention was changed to December. The most
obvious and important reason for the change occurred when South Carolina received
reassuring news from Georgia. At this point cooperation with other southern states
seemed more assured than ever. Governor Brown’s recommendation for a convention
was well received in Georgia and several federal officers in Savannah and Milledgeville
had already resigned. But aside from events in Georgia, there was also considerable
45
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public pressure on the legislature to move the convention to an earlier date.48 The
Charleston Courier reminded the legislature that “We must look to the moral and
political effect of our movement upon the other Southern States and upon the people at
large.” Although there was some danger in precipitation, the paper argued that “there is
far more danger from that hesitation of policy that, by delaying action, we show to the
South that South Carolina trembles in her shoes, and that South Carolina is not prepared
to stand up to her principles of the past.” Sterner warnings came from the Mercury.49
Whatever the exact reason for the change, and there is good reason to believe the news
from Georgia was decisive, the legislature approved the new date set for December 17 by
a vote of 117 to 0 in the House and 42 to 0 in the Senate. On November 10th James
Chesnut Jr. resigned his seat in the United States Senate followed by Hammond the next
day. With the exception of formalities, the Union was no more in South Carolina.50
At long last the radicals had finally won the prize. Or had they? As the evidence
makes clear, secession had to wait until it seemed certain that other southern states would
follow. Rhett and his radical faction had done much to push South Carolina towards
disunion over the previous fifteen years but were unsuccessful until Lincoln’s election.
Whatever foggy vision the radicals had of southern nationalism during the first secession
crisis, their vision was becoming clearer by 1860. Secession was an external revolution; it
did not create an internal revolution within the state. Political harmony was created from
an outside threat, and therefore, what appeared to be a movement of unity on the surface
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was actually artificial. The question of method had been answered when cooperation was
assured in 1860 but now other and perhaps more difficult questions were raised. The
political divisions that were formed throughout the 1850’s and during the secession crisis
are important because they give shape not just to secession but to joining the Confederacy
as well. What was this new southern confederacy to look like? Was South Carolina
merely interested in preserving the antebellum status quo, or were serious political,
economic, and social alterations the desired end? Would the intense factionalism that
existed in the state continue once a southern confederacy was formed, or would it be
reshaped in a way that was unintended? What would happen to the state’s existing
political system should war occur? Would the legislature continue to exert primary
control over state policy in this new situation, or would the governor be given expanded
powers? What role would the state convention play in this process? In short, what was
this “revolution” about? There was no shortage of differing opinions regarding these
complex and ideological questions and as South Carolina politicians pondered these
questions and proposed tentative answers, many must have wondered how much political
continuity from the antebellum era would remain.
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Chapter Two
The Nature of the Revolution
In declining a nomination to the South Carolina secession convention, Andrew
Magrath wrote to the editor of the Mercury and urged “we must avoid distraction:-we
must banish division. Let us not have, in the selection of those who will represent us in
that Convention, the influence of those feelings which belong to the action of ordinary
political parties. In this issue we have but one party-that is our State.”51 The Mercury
itself, which had been at the forefront of creating political divisions in the state during the
preceding decade, claimed that “Personal preferences should have no place in our
counsels.” It asked South Carolinians to “endeavor and see first whether a ticket of our
best and ablest and soundest men, irrespective of any previous political and personal
affinities, cannot be so arranged and brought out as to meet the views of the community
at large, and obtain a general support.”52
Magrath’s letter and the Mercury’s editorial are indicative of the type of political
culture South Carolina politicians hoped secession would create. George Rable has
termed this desire “A Revolution Against Politics.” The divisive effect of partisanship
and factionalism would be eliminated in the interest of harmony. It was hoped that
selfish men would no longer make politics a profession. Rable explains that “a glorious
past of wise statesmanship would be restored. Low taxes, limited government, and civic
virtue would characterize a perfected republic built on the twin foundations of white
liberty and black slavery.” The construction of this new republic would rest on social
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52

Charleston Mercury, November 14, 1860.
Ibid.

30

harmony, political consensus, and unquestionable legitimacy.53 Yet, old habits die hard,
especially in South Carolina where a long history of political division had existed and
specifically over the question of secession for the better part of the antebellum era.
Whether the state’s leading politicians could agree and form a consensus on the nature of
their revolution and on a program that would provide a basis for a southern slaveholding
republic was by no means clear.
On December 6 South Carolinians elected delegates to the secession convention.
The nomination process was generally marked by mass meetings with candidates
nominated to a single ticket. The idea was to fuse differing factions and present a
delegation that was united on the issue of immediate secession. The effort to bury old
party differences for the sake of unity caused some trouble in Charleston and reflected the
bitter feelings still being felt between the cooperationists and radicals.54 Despite the
Mercury’s insistence that “Personal preferences should have no place in our counsels,” it
proceeded to classify candidates as “explicit” or “not explicit” on the question of
immediate and permanent secession.55 This action caused much resentment on the part of
the moderates who claimed that it was they who had helped unify the state on a program
of secession. Cooperationists resented the arbitrary labeling of candidates who were
sincere in their desire to protect the interests of South Carolina. Addressing a meeting at
Institute Hall in Charleston, Edward McCradly explained the position of the
cooperationists. “I have heard that I have been accused during the present canvass by
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some of those who acted with me at that time [the first secession crisis], that I had
receded from the position I then occupied. It is not so. What I was in 1850, I am in
1860…But what was unattainable in 1850 is now within our reach, and I then insisted
that this time would come.”56 Most districts across the state accepted the single ticket
plan and nearly every candidate nominated to the convention was committed to
immediate separate action.57 But the context had changed after Lincoln’s election. Now
just about everyone in the state was committed to cooperation. Still, the episode reveals
that factionalism within the state had not entirely disappeared in the weeks leading up to
secession.
That factionalism was still lingering in state politics can be seen in the election of
a new governor. Senator James Chesnut Jr. was nominated by the Charleston Courier and
Robert Barnwell Rhett by the Charleston Mercury. Benjamin J. Johnson was also a likely
candidate. But a nomination also came from Edgefield, where Francis W. Pickens had
recently returned from serving as ambassador to Russia.58 Soon after his return, Pickens
addressed a crowd in Edgefield. He explained how South Carolina had been wronged by
the federal government and reaffirmed his belief that secession was the “clear and
indisputable right of a sovereign people.” Pickens was then invited to address the General
Assembly and did so on November 30. His speech clearly catered to the wishes of the
radical secessionists and he assured them “I would be willing to appeal to the god of
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battles-if need be, cover the state with ruin, conflagration, and blood rather than
submit.”59
Pickens was paving the way to the state’s executive office by first appealing to the
cooperationists and then apparently changing his position to a more radical one. He thus
seemed to satisfy both factions by acting as a compromise candidate, which was no doubt
a central reason for his nomination. Rhett, who had done so much to bring about
secession, was passed over for governor. The primary reason seems to have been a lack
of trust in his leadership abilities. The famous botanist and diarist from Charleston,
William Henry Ravenel, thought Rhett to be “the most untrustworthy politician in the
State.” He lacked good judgment and “can never be relied on for statesmanship as a
leader.”60 After five ballots in the legislature, Rhett withdrew his name and Pickens was
elected on the seventh ballot.61
The nomination of Pickens in order to bury differences seems to have worked. In
Charleston, the Courier proclaimed “All rejoice that F.W. Pickens is elected governor at
last. All parties are reconciled to the result.” In the state capital, the Southern Guardian
presented Pickens as “a gentleman in every way competent to discharge the high and
responsible duties of the office to which he has been chosen.” And in the Upstate, he was
considered “a man of ability and experience, and withal, prudent in action.”62 Meanwhile,
the secession convention met as planned on December 17 in Columbia. One study of the
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secession conventions has identified that of the 169 delegates to the South Carolina
convention, the average delegate possessed a total wealth of $104, 053.86. Moreover, 153
delegates, or 90.5 per cent held slaves in 1860. The average holding based on total
membership in the convention was 58.8 slaves, while the median was 37 slaves.63 Clearly
this was a body composed of South Carolina’s planter-elite who no doubt spoke for their
own interests. This had always been the intention of South Carolina politicians. To them,
it was only natural that the state’s elite should rule.
David F. Jamison, who was president of the convention, addressed the members.
After providing a detailed explanation as to why South Carolina was unsafe under the
United States Constitution, he declared “Written Constitutions are worthless, unless they
are written, at the same time, in the hearts, and founded on the interests of a people; and
as there is no common bond of sympathy of interest between the North and the South, all
efforts to preserve this Union will not only be fruitless, but fatal to the less numerous
section.” He then closed his speech with Danton’s declaration before the critical battle of
Valmy during the French Revolution: “To dare! and again to dare! and without end to
dare!”64
Jamison’s decision to quote Danton is curious. Was he serious? Did secession
mean revolution? Perhaps so, but the kind of revolution secession was supposed to be
remained ill-defined. Southerners wanted to link their revolution to the American
Revolution of 1776. But Thomas Jefferson’s assertions of human equality understandably
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caused unease among secessionists hoping for the creation of a slave republic firmly
rooted in ideas of inequality. The Declaration of Independence then, was central to
secession. It could be used by South Carolina politicians to deny egalitarian principles but
it could also be invoked to defend an oppressed people from a tyrannical government. In
this case, Lincoln and the Republicans surely represented a threat to white liberty. But
there was another problem that had little to do with Lincoln and the Republicans. This
was the threat to liberty that could come from revolution itself. George Rable has argued
that by its very nature the “right of revolution was such a latitudinarian idea that by
implication it might well lead to the kind of radical-and if one dared think it-Jacobinical
revolution that the cooperationists had warned against and the secessionists feared.” At
the very least, contemporary southern politicians embraced the notion of a “conservative
revolution.” Seemingly paradoxical in nature, Rable has observed that southerners “could
redefine revolution to suit their present situation…A Southern revolution would
presumably harmonize with Southern traditions of state sovereignty, individual liberty,
and slavery.”65 But would the sovereignty of states, individual liberty, and the institution
of slavery remain secure after secession? South Carolina politicians hoped so and
probably thought it would be safer in a southern confederacy. Yet, the future remained
unpredictable.
Before the convention could proceed to business a resolution was proposed to
adjourn to Charleston on account of a smallpox outbreak in Columbia. This caused a
temporary panic among some radicals who thought any delay might have an ill effect on
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other southern states. As a gesture to assure the other cotton states of South Carolina’s
intentions, John A. Inglis offered a resolution that “South Carolina should forthwith
secede from the Federal Union, known as the United States of America” before
adjourning to Charleston. The resolution was unanimously adopted.66 When the
convention reassembled in Charleston it began its business of separating the state from
the Union. Cooperation with other southern states seemed more assured then ever.67 On
December 20 the committee of an ordinance of secession made its report and was
adopted by another unanimous vote of all 169 delegates. All members of the South
Carolina delegation in Congress quickly resigned. The convention then moved from St.
Andrews Hall to Institute Hall where the governor and both houses of the legislature
could be present for the ceremonial signing of the ordinance. The atmosphere in
Charleston was explosive. Three thousand people cheered the members of the convention
as they walked in to sign the document severing the ties of South Carolina to the Union.
The day after the signing, the Mercury proclaimed December 20 “an epoch in the history
of the human race. A great Confederated Republic, overwrought with arrogant and
tyrannous oppressions, has fallen from its high estate amongst the nations of the
earth…The problem of self-government under the check-balance of slavery, has secured
itself from threatened destruction.”68
The Mercury’s editorial is instructive. If the exact nature of the revolution was
murky there can be no question as to the basic and fundamental reason that caused the act
66
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of secession. Fear over the future of slavery was clearly the central and pivotal reason for
the act. A. G. Magrath, who would be South Carolina’s governor in the closing months of
the war, wrote afterwards during his imprisonment at Fort Pulaski near Savannah Georgia
on the cause of secession. Magrath’s words provide a fascinating illustration of how
fundamental the institution of slavery was to daily life and how fear over its future
existence lay at the root of secession:
All of the transactions of life were based upon it; all of the arrangements for the
progress of society were made with reference to it; and the civilization, I may say,
of the people in the States in which slavery existed, were regarded as unavoidably
connected with it; inseparably dependent upon it. It was thus that the remarkable
unanimity was produced in all of these states. No other cause would have
produced it. I have said that other considerations attached themselves to it; they
were merely incidents to it; of themselves they could never have produced the
same result…It was the apprehension of the invasion of this right of property
which…was the motive power of the revolution.69

In addition to the Secession Ordinance, the convention also produced two other
important documents. The first one, headed by Christopher Memminger, was the
“Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of South
Carolina.” The Declaration essentially defended the right of secession under the compact
theory of the Union. The exercise of that right was explicitly justified in the document on
the basis that the northern states had infringed upon the compact because of their refusal
to abide by the Constitution in regard to slavery. In the Declaration, slavery was at the top
69
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of the list for justifying secession. Now that Lincoln was about to assume the office of the
presidency, the convention believed “slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.” The
Republican Party would wage a war “against slavery until it shall cease throughout the
United States.”70 This brought about some opposition from certain members who were
rightfully concerned that such a plainly stated reason for secession might not invoke
sympathies around the world. An effort to send the Declaration back to committee failed,
however, by a vote of 124 to 31. Laurence Keitt was opposed to any alteration of the
document because, he reminded the convention, “slavery is the great central point from
which we are now proceeding.”71
The second document, written by Rhett, was entitled an “Address to the
Slaveholding States,” and intended to show that the entire crisis resulted from the
overthrow of the United States Constitution. According to Rhett, the North’s blatant
violation of the Constitution was “The one great evil, from which all other evils have
flowed.” For Rhett, northerners and southerners were two distinct people with divergent
interests. The Constitution was an experiment. “The experiment has failed” said Rhett. It
had failed to unite two very different peoples. Moreover, the northern states, by
possessing a majority in Congress, had created a “consolidated” government that
impinged on the rights of the states. In any case, southerners would constitute a great
nation on their own and they deserved their own country. “All we demand of other
peoples is, to be let alone, to work out our high destinies.”72 Rhett’s Address celebrated
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the breaking up of the United States and left no room for looking back or returning to the
Union under any circumstances. He clearly designed it to permanently settle the question
of whether an independent southern confederacy should be formed.73
The convention answered the question with an affirmative. However, in the meantime, South Carolina would operate as an independent republic. To realize the new
situation South Carolina leaders would have to alter the existing administrative
organization of the state. Well before the first shot was ever fired the convention began to
change the existing status quo in regard to the state’s long history of political practice and
culture. The most obvious and drastic changes made to the State Constitution were in the
powers delegated to the governor. To solve the potential problems facing the state as a
result of secession, convention members thought that a stronger executive was needed. It
was generally understood that the convention had the power to amend the state
constitution since this was the primary function and purpose of conventions in the first
place. Accordingly, the convention passed an ordinance “To amend the Constitution of
the State of South Carolina in respect to the Executive Department.” This measure
enlarged the duties of the governor and delegated powers to him that were unknown in
the antebellum period. Among the newly delegated powers, the governor was authorized
to conduct foreign relations, make diplomatic appointments and treaties, and allowed to
choose a cabinet74 responsible to him. In short, the governor was now given powers that
were formerly exercised by the President of the United States.75
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Unfortunately, Pickens’s personality was not well suited for such power. His mien
was very authoritative and he did not take well to the opinions of others. A recent
biographer of Pickens believes his “aloofness and overbearing personality were real
handicaps. Egoism and arrogance were not uncommon in Carolina cavaliers, but Pickens
demonstrated these traits to the fullest. He gained notoriety as a pedant. Past political
intrigues and battles had caused many of the state’s most prominent families to dislike
him…He was a man of ideas, an acute observer, but not a man of firm action.”76 His was
not a personality that was well suited to handle the delicate situation involving the federal
occupation of Fort Sumter.
On the night of December 26 Major Robert Anderson moved his federal garrison
from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. Francis Pickens was in an unenviable position. To
most South Carolinians, the occupation of the forts surrounding Charleston Harbor by a
foreign nation was unacceptable. The story of diplomatic maneuvering in regard to Fort
Sumter has been well told by many historians77 and it is not necessary to recount the story
in detail here. However, it is worth noting that the entire episode is but another example
of how political factionalism came to play an important role in state politics. From the
beginning Pickens was under heavy pressure and constant criticism from the radicals to
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seize Fort Sumter by force. The Mercury kept up a steady fire of attacks on both Pickens
and the government in Washington.78 Several diplomatic blunders by Pickens and his
handling of the commissioner’s mission to Washington did not improve the situation or
his image.79 Mary Boykin Chesnut observed that when Major Anderson had moved into
Fort Sumter, Governor Pickens was “sleeping serenely.” She was depressed that the kind
of men put in office at the time of the crisis was “invariably some sleeping dead head
long forgotten and passed over.”80
The situation was somewhat complicated by events soon to take place in
Montgomery. Using good judgment, Pickens seems to have pursued a conservative
policy that sought to obtain Fort Sumter by peaceful means. He understood the state was
unprepared to force a demand for surrender but wanted to appear bold and courageous.
Accordingly, he used aggressive language but essentially hesitated between independent
South Carolina action and delay until a southern confederacy could be formed and
assume responsibility. This greatly upset some radicals, especially Rhett, who thought
Pickens ought to attack Fort Sumter immediately without waiting for events to unfold at
the convention in Montgomery. On January 21 Rhett walked into Pickens’s temporary
office and demanded that Fort Sumter be taken at once. “Certainly, Mr. Rhett; I have no
objection! I will furnish you with some men, and you can storm the work yourself”
78
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answered Pickens. Rhett responded “But, sir, I am not a military man!” “Nor I either,”
retorted Pickens, “and therefore I take the advice of those who are!”81 The Mercury even
advocated that South Carolina avoid entering a southern confederacy until Anderson was
removed from Fort Sumter, while the Columbia Southern Guardian wondered “Why not
is Fort Sumter attacked?”82 Clearly, the pressure on Pickens from the radical faction to
act decisively was very great.
On the other hand, there was pressure from moderates as well, such as Alfred
Huger, who asked “Is not the refusal on the part of Major Anderson to receive
reinforcements binding upon us not to molest him and his handful of men? Should he not
be considered as an object of our care instead of assault?”83 Perhaps Huger’s moderation
was atypical in the state, but it was quite typical of the sentiment outside the state.
Pickens was under considerable pressure from political leaders across the South to
exercise caution. In Virginia Governor Letcher thought the times demanded “coolness,
calmness, and firmness, united with prudence, wisdom, moderation and patriotism.” He
was fearful that “an error committed now can never perhaps be corrected.”84 Jefferson
Davis suggested Anderson’s presence was a matter of pride and advised Pickens that
delay was the prudent course to take. Similar advice was offered by Governor Brown in
Georgia.85
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On the whole, the course Pickens chose was a policy of “wait and see.” The tactic
worked well, although Pickens upset both factions in the state to some degree. The
radicals were disappointed that the newly-elected governor was not more aggressive in
his determination to seize Fort Sumter, and they understandably accused him of
indecisiveness and delay. It was a charge that would be later used effectively by his
political enemies. The moderates, while pleased that Pickens had avoided a confrontation,
were somewhat taken back by his decision to take matters into his own hands instead of
waiting for responses from the commissioners who had been sent to Washington to
negotiate for the forts. It was a situation where no faction would be entirely pleased but
Pickens’s course of action on the whole seems to have met with general approval. The
legislature, for example, unanimously approved Pickens’s course in regard to the Star of
the West and Fort Sumter. The legislature further pledged itself to “earnest, vigorous, and
unhesitating support,” for every measure that was adopted to defend the state. Fortunately
for Pickens, the Confederate government assumed control of the harbor defenses in early
March.86 For the time being, Pickens could breathe a sigh of relief.
While Pickens was handling the situation regarding Fort Sumter, the convention
was busy dealing with the first efforts to establish a southern confederacy. Rhett offered
the first resolution to put the plan in motion. On December 26 he proposed an ordinance
specifying Montgomery as the meeting place and February 13 as the date for a southern
convention of slaveholding states. Although Rhett’s ordinance was tabled, the reports and
resolutions adopted December 31 were nearly identical to Rhett’s original proposal. They
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called for South Carolina to elect a commissioner to each southern state which had called
its own state convention and that the commissioners propose a conference of the said
states to meet at the earliest possible date before March 4. They further stipulated that the
United States Constitution be the basis for a provisional constitution; that voting be done
by the states at the proposed conference; that South Carolina’s delegates be elected by
convention ballot.87 In accordance with the report, the first commissioners were elected
on January 2 and were soon sent out to preach secession to the other southern states.88
In the balloting for delegates to Montgomery the convention selected a body of
men who were, for the most part, moderate in their political makeup. With the exception
of Rhett and Keitt, it was a group that had been in favor of cooperation and moderation in
1852.89 Emory Thomas has argued that secession was basically a negative process. Once
secession became a reality, there remained the task of building a nation. More
importantly, Thomas explains that moderation prevailed at the Montgomery convention
because “the fundamental goal of the Southern revolution was the preservation of the
Southern life style as Southerners then lived it.” Southerners wanted to preserve the
existing status quo and were “not willing to expand or intensify that status quo.” In short,
Confederates “were more than happy with the world they already had.”90 There is much
to be said for accepting the model offered by Thomas. But is his interpretation applicable
to South Carolina? Were Rhett and his supporters merely content to accept the status quo,
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or did Rhett have a very different vision of the type of government than the one created at
Montgomery? If so, what do these differences say about the revolution for the radical
faction in the state? Answering these ideological questions can illuminate serious
differences not only at Montgomery but in the Palmetto State itself.
In the whirlwind of secession there was little time to debate such important
questions and reflect on the nature of the nascent republic. Speed was of the essence to
the radicals, whose fear of “reconstruction” of the old Union was ever present. Still,
Rhett’s ideas of what the new nation should be was deep and fixed. At heart Rhett was an
ideologue. He left little room for compromise and rejected any plans that would appeal to
the Border States. His most recent biographer explains that “his vision encompassed
really only the most solidly slavery-based states in the Deep South, the cotton, rice, and
sugar states that could be trusted to see their interests wholly wrapped up in maintaining
their institutions free of the taint of lingering Union pangs.”91 Rhett’s vision will be
analyzed in more detail below, but there can be no doubt that the factionalism which
existed in South Carolina over the previous fifteen years accompanied the delegation to
Montgomery. Alexander Stephens said of the South Carolina delegation, “No two of
them agree. They are all jealous of each other- no news- there is no harmony or cordiality
among them- always respectful in debate but they talk about and against each other.” No
other delegation stood as evenly divided during the Montgomery convention as did South
Carolina’s.92
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Exactly why the South Carolina delegation was so divided is not easy to explain.
The delegation certainly played a prominent role at the Montgomery convention. Yet, the
delegation was nonetheless divided and there is reason to believe its lack of unity
stemmed from Rhett’s vision of what the new government should be. Rhett was not
looking to create a government that simply protected the existing status quo in the South.
His dream was to create a government that was much different than the one that was
created in Montgomery. Thomas has correctly pointed out that the “Confederacy created
at Montgomery was not exactly what the super-Southerners like Rhett, Ruffin, and
Yancey wanted.”93 The first important dispute was on the purpose of the convention
itself. For Rhett, the meeting at Montgomery was simply a constitutional convention to
establish a permanent government. A provisional government was dangerous since it
might result in “reconstruction” of the old Union. One of the first resolutions Rhett
offered was to appoint a committee that would “report to this Congress a constitution for
a permanent government of the States represented in this Congress.”94 With the exception
of Barnwell, the entire South Carolina delegation opposed his view.95
The Provisional Constitution created at Montgomery was criticized in South
Carolina, especially by the Mercury. It was “unfortunate and mal apropos that the stigma
of illegitimacy of slavery should be placed upon the institution of slavery by a
fundamental law against the slave-trade. In our opinion it is a matter of policy, and not of
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principle.” It regretted “that any Provisional Government was formed at all” and
expressed amazement “that any Southern Government, whether for a month or a year,
would sanction the policy of Protective Tariffs.”96 L.W. Spratt voiced his concern that if
the slave-trade was not reopened then the future of slavery itself might be in jeopardy. A
slave population at least equal to the white was necessary for the institution to continue.
Spratt pointed to Virginia where “there are about 500,000 slaves to about 1,000,000
whites; and as at least as many slaves as masters are necessary to the constitution of a
slave society.” “Virginia,” Spratt said, “does not truly know whether she is of the North
or South in this great movement.” In any case, the Confederacy was a slave republic and
any prohibition on the slave-trade would be fundamentally at odds with the principles of
a slave society. Even before a Permanent Constitution was adopted Spratt was already
predicting that “to this end another revolution may be necessary.”97
When the Permanent Confederate Constitution was adopted by the Provisional
Congress on March 11, there was little of the South Carolina program in it. Oddly
enough, it was Rhett who chaired the committee that drafted the document. Rhett thought
the new government must be a slaveholder’s republic in the purest sense. Yet, almost
every proposal by the South Carolina delegation was defeated.98 This included a lengthy
list of attempts to remedy what were considered defects in the Permanent Constitution.
As previously mentioned, the motion to strike out the constitutional prohibition of the
slave trade was supported by some in South Carolina who saw the trade as necessary for
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the survival of the institution. More important, supporters of the slave-trade quite
reasonably claimed it was inconsistent for a slave republic to contain provisions limiting
the expansion of the very institution it was created to protect. To those who supported
reopening the Slave Trade, if slavery as an institution was right then the slave trade was a
natural extension of the system; it too was right and should be expressed as a principle in
the constitution. This motion, however, did not receive the support of any other state.99
W.W. Boyce proposed an amendment that would guarantee “the right of
secession of any State from this Confederacy.” Here again, the South Carolina delegation
stood alone.100 Obviously, the state which led the secession movement could see no
reason why such a fundamental principle would be objected to. Laurence Keitt hoped to
strike out the clause by which only three-fifths of the slave population was counted for
purposes of representation. Keitt wanted all slaves to be counted for determining
representation. Given the number of slaves in South Carolina, this measure would have
greatly strengthened South Carolina’s position in the Confederate Congress. This
proposal was also lost.101 The South Carolina delegation also wished to give state
legislatures the exclusive power of choosing presidential electors. This is hardly
surprising since South Carolina’s constitution did exactly this. The delegation must have
been genuinely frustrated when this too was defeated and left to lie on the table.102
But it was the failure to prohibit the future admission to the Confederacy of
nonslaveholding states that generated the greatest uproar in South Carolina. The Mercury
99
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thundered that “we are in danger, if the views of the Constitution-makers are carried into
practice, of being dragged back eventually into the political affiliation with the States and
peoples from whom we have just cut loose.”103 A southern confederacy could never be
safe if admission was open to free states since “Anti-slavery has been taken in with their
mothers’ milk, grown with their growth and strengthened with their strength, until so
thoroughly assimilated into their constitutions as to become a part of their political
principles, their ethics, and their religious faith.” Almost without exception “the universal
sentiment” in the North “is one of condemnation of Southern civilization and Southern
citizens.” Since the North and South are “two distinct people,” would it be sensible for
southerners “after ridding themselves of the perilous connection,” to allow a people “so
inimical, and whose hostility by that instrumentality has already proved both troublesome
and dangerous to the South” to ever join the Confederacy? The answer was self-evident
since the question involved “little less than the destinies of the South.”104 The Keowee
Courier was hardly less outspoken in its opposition and predicted that the inclusion of
Free States would spell disaster for the Confederacy.105
If Rhett was frustrated that most of the South Carolina program was rejected at
Montgomery, he must have been even more disappointed when he was not given an
administrative position in the new government. He certainly felt entitled to the presidency
as a reward for his lifelong efforts at establishing a southern nation, and he surely felt that
his vision was the best one to shape the new government. This dream, however, quickly

103

Charleston Mercury, March 25, 1861.
Charleston Mercury, March 27, 1861.
105
Keowee Courier, April 6, 1861.

104

49

faded as he found his own delegation unwilling to support him.106 Nor did the South
Carolina delegation, composed mostly of former cooperationists, stand by Rhett in his bid
for Secretary of State. That prestigious cabinet position went to Robert Toombs of
Georgia, much to the dismay of Rhett’s supporters in South Carolina. Soon after the
appointment, the Mercury complained “this post was due to South Carolina, who
proposed and inaugurated secession, and whose people have hitherto borne the chief
hardships and losses of the Revolution.” The editorial went on to say Rhett “would have
been pleased” to have received the appointment and did not hide the fact the South
Carolina delegation, with the exception of Keitt, “who is no friend to Mr. Rhett- are all of
the old co-operation party of 1852.”107 As for the selection of president, the delegation
was also divided. “Everyone determined his own course for himself” remarked William
Porcher Miles. Boyce expressed violent opposition to Jefferson Davis as did Laurence
Keitt. But Robert Barnwell and James Chesnut Jr. supported Davis along with Miles. And
it was Barnwell who persuaded Rhett (after strenuous effort) to cast the deciding vote for
Davis.108 It was hardly a showing of solidarity and clearly, the state’s long history of
political factionalism would not simply fade away for the sake of unity.
It is tempting to over-emphasize South Carolina’s opposition to the Permanent
Constitution. Obviously there was much disgust that the amendments offered by the
South Carolina delegation were rejected. But it would be a profound mistake to assert
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that all South Carolinians were unanimously opposed to its ratification. It would be an
even greater mistake to assume that dissension and disillusionment with the Confederate
experiment was already widespread before the first shot was fired. Indeed, the Permanent
Constitution was generally well received in the Palmetto State. The Charleston Evening
News thought “every one seems pleased” and expressed its hope that “the radicals will
not wage a wicked and suicidal opposition to any of its provisions.” From Pickens Court
House, the Keowee Courier believed the new document to be “the best Constitution yet
formed for the government of man.” Even the Mercury considered it “the best
Constitution, for the security of liberty and justice, the world has ever seen.” However, it
was quick to point out there were “several serious defects.”109 It was on these perceived
defects that considerable opposition occurred in the South Carolina convention. The
Permanent Constitution held all the cards for factional division in South Carolina. Nearly
every point of contention had already been debated in the legislature during the previous
fifteen years. Now, when unity was of the utmost importance, the convention’s actions
would determine whether South Carolina could accept and ratify the new constitution.
The debate can also tell us much about the radicals’ vision and the future of the
Confederacy. The radicals may have lost at Montgomery but they were to be heard again
once the debate over ratification began in South Carolina.
It is significant that only South Carolina seriously debated the merits of the
Constitution. Across the South state conventions were quick to avoid procedural delay
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and ratified the Constitution with near unanimity.110 But in South Carolina the debate was
lengthy and often bitter, reflecting not only the general discourse of South Carolina’s
political culture but also its reputation as the most radical of the southern states. The
South Carolina convention reassembled on March 25 to consider ratifying the
Confederate Constitution in secret session. Within three days after the convention
reassembled, Gabriel Manigault of Charleston offered a resolution expressing the
convention’s conviction that the Constitution “is imperfect and objectionable, and ought
to be amended on the following points.” These were listed as being first, the possibility of
“leaving the door open to the admission of non-slaveholding States into this
Confederacy”; second, “In adopting the basis of only three-fifths of the slaves in
calculating federal population”; third, “In granting the Government of the Confederacy an
unlimited power of indirect taxation”; fourth, “In making the prohibition to import
Africans a constitutional principle, and not merely giving to the Confederate Government
the power to prohibit it as a matter of expediency”; fifth, “In continuing the Post Office
monopoly in the hands of the Confederate Government.”111 J. Izard Middleton thought
the Constitution did nothing to guarantee “the right and power of self-government at
home.” He then proposed a resolution stating the Constitution “cannot be accepted by
South Carolina, unless it be amended in all the particulars above specified.”112
As with the Provisional Constitution, it was the first of these grievances that
caused the greatest opposition. The Mercury was severely critical of the defect, observing
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that “in South Carolina it is looked upon with alarm.” It admitted “there would be some
opposition, but no one ever dreamed it would assume so formidable an appearance.”113
Rhett addressed the issue with a resolution on April 2 which declared “this State does not
consider herself bound to enter or continue in confederation with any State not tolerating
the institution of slavery within its limits by fundamental law.” The resolution was tabled,
however, and nothing further was done.114 There was general agreement that amendments
were needed but a motion to consider amendments before ratification failed to pass by
forty-six votes. A motion to immediately call a constitutional convention was also lost by
a vote of 101 to 44. The convention did, however, agree to consider amendments after the
vote on ratification. It was resolved that once the Confederate government was “securely
established and in peaceful operation, the State of South Carolina ought to demand that,
two other States concurring, the Congress shall summon a Convention of all the States, to
take into consideration the following amendments to the said Constitution, to wit.”115
The proposed amendments included remedies to the grievances already indicated.
They were agreed to by a vote of 117 to 15 and “indicate the almost unanimous opinion
that amendments were desirable but that agitation for them should be postponed until a
more appropriate time.”116 On April 3 the convention voted overwhelmingly in favor of
ratification, the vote being 138 to 21.117 Significantly, Rhett voted in favor of ratification,
indicating general acceptance of the document for the radical faction. Of course, not all
radicals were content. L.W. Spratt, commenting on the prohibition of the slave trade
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thought “our whole movement is defeated…thence another revolution. It may be painful,
but we must make it.”118
This was the second time that Spratt thought another revolution was not only
desirable, but absolutely necessary. It was not that Spratt and the radicals were calling for
continuous revolution. They did not want one revolution after another. Rather, the
radicals did not consider the revolution complete. Radicals were actually conservative
men who were seeking to preserve a status quo that was yet to be achieved. Radicals
were uncertain if this status quo could be achieved through the Confederate government.
For them, the Constitution was one means to an end that was still evolving. Having
worked for an independent southern nation for the past decade, the radicals were not
content to quietly acquiesce to a document they considered imperfect on several key
issues they had so adamantly supported during the antebellum era. Many of the radicals
were ideologues who held deeply rooted convictions about what this southern
confederacy was supposed to be. For men like Rhett, Keitt, Gist, and others of their
tenacity, concern over appeasing the Upper South, let alone the Border States, was of
secondary importance to principle. If some have wondered why Rhett displayed such
violent anger towards the Confederate government throughout the course of the Civil
War, it is reasonable to assume the roots of his discontent can be traced to the debate over
ratification of the Permanent Constitution and the creation of the Confederacy.
George Rable was only partially correct when he argued “ardent secessionists
seeking to dissolve the Union paid little attention to the long-run consequences. The most
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earnest Southern “nationalists” (if they can even be called that) spoke and wrote in only
the vaguest terms about their “nation’s” characteristics and prospects. Despite their
flaming rhetoric, they had no more of a blueprint for the future than did cooperationists,
who appealed to conservatism, caution, and fear of revolution.”119 It is certainly
plausible and probably accurate that the radicals paid little attention to the long-run
consequences. But Rhett and other radicals in South Carolina did have a vision of what a
southern nation should look like. Perhaps they were unrealistic in their expectations but
they nevertheless at the time of ratification seemed determined to push ahead with
another revolution. It was critical to them because of past political experiences in the
Union. More than anyone else, the radicals had voiced violent opposition to the existing
political structure of the United States. This was a chance, perhaps their only chance, to
purify a political system that had gone wrong. The radicals were aware that war loomed
on the horizon and understood that they must make temporary concessions until the
Confederacy was peacefully established and stable. They understood the need to be
practicable but they also wanted to carry the revolution through to its fullest
manifestation, which was the radical agenda Rhett had been espousing for years.
On the other hand, ratification was a clear victory for the moderate faction. For
them, the Constitution was both the means and ends of the revolution. They sought to end
the movement as quickly as possible so it might not spin out of control and alienate key
states in the Upper South. It is difficult to determine exactly how many voting citizens in
South Carolina were either radical or moderate. Part of the difficultly is that these
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positions were not static and they could fluctuate depending on the time, issue, and
unfolding of events. But Emory Thomas is probably correct when he observed that
“Southerners generally had adopted radical rhetoric and tactics to transform their
ideology in to nationalism; but once that transformation had occurred in secession, the
radicals became superfluous.”120 Perhaps the radicals became superfluous in South
Carolina as well, but not at first. Their agenda was seriously debated and considered at
length in the convention. Nevertheless, considering that the South Carolina delegation to
Montgomery was composed of moderates and former cooperationists, and given the
lopsided vote in the state convention favoring ratification of the Constitution, Thomas’s
point is well taken. The radicals, who were still trying to conserve a status quo that was
yet to be achieved, still did not consider the revolution complete. The revolution would
go on. But would it go on in a way that moved away from the radical view or from the
moderate view? Would the moderates be able to end the revolution and uphold South
Carolina’s political tradition of individualism, local autonomy, limited government, and
keep power vested in the legislature?
There also remained one larger and nagging question. Before the convention
adjourned on April 10, a difference of opinion arose as to whether or not the convention
should adjourn sine die. There were some who thought that once the Confederate
Constitution was ratified, the business of the convention was complete. The convention
had written a new constitution, taken South Carolina out the Union, and provided an
ordinance to prepare the state for the possibility of war. Those tasks had been
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accomplished and many thought it was the convention’s duty to dissolve itself. However,
a great many also thought the convention should adjourn subject to call of the president if
some possible future emergency arose. After lengthy debate it was agreed that President
Jamison could reconvene the body at any time before January 1, 1862. If, however, it was
not reassembled by that date then the convention’s existence would end.121 Seemingly a
trivial matter, it held all the cards for a fundamental and explosive debate over the proper
exercise of power and sovereignty. A war which promised to touch South Carolina’s
shores would test the cohesion of its long political tradition nearly to its breaking point.
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Chapter Three
The Exigencies of War: The Convention and
Executive Council
On the eve of secession South Carolina was ill-prepared for war. The militia
system had not been reorganized since 1841 and enforcement of those out-dated
provisions had been inadequate.122 Governor Gist and the legislature took preliminary
steps in November 1860 but it was not until December 17, the day the convention met,
that the new legislature acted in a decisive manner. It passed “An ACT to Provide an
Armed Military Force” which established a volunteer system based on the existing
militia. Governor Pickens was authorized “to call into the service of the state, from time
to time, such portion of the militia as he may deem necessary and proper.” One volunteer
company of infantry from each infantry battalion of the militia was called into service for
twelve months and the Governor was authorized to impose a draft if any battalion did not
fill its quota in thirty days.123 State coercion, it seemed, would take the place of local
autonomy to help fill regiments. In these first months of secessionist fervor few
complaints were voiced against such measures and nobody seems to have commented on
their paradoxical nature.124 While there was general acquiescence to these measures in
the beginning it remained to be seen if similar state actions would receive support in the
future.
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The act also authorized the governor to raise several cavalry regiments for state
defense not exceeding twelve months. All of these forces were to be “fully armed and
equipped when mustered into service” by the state.125 The convention gave the governor
further authority on January 1 to call into service “existing Volunteer Companies”
attached to the militia “until superseded by the organization of the force provided for by
the recent Act of the General Assembly.”126 This was a response of the convention to
Major Anderson’s occupation of Fort Sumter and allowed for the immediate formation of
volunteer companies for six months. A regular military establishment was provided for
on January 28 by the legislature. This time, the legislature stipulated “all noncommissioned officers and privates shall be enlisted to serve for a period of three years,
unless sooner discharged.”127 With the legislative acts of December 17 and January 28
and the convention resolution of January 1, South Carolina had provided the first troops
for the possibility of war. These measures were designed to put the state on a more
permanent war-footing. Both the legislature and the convention were doing their utmost
to provide for the common defense and at this point, power was exercised evenly
between the legislature and the convention. Neither of these measures raised any protest
as they were consistent with the state constitution. Governor Pickens had also done a fine
job solving the state’s deficiency in small arms by purchasing some 300,000 pounds of
cannon and musket powder from Hazard’s Mills in Connecticut.128 By all appearances
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the legislature, convention, and governor were acting in unison on important military
considerations.
Meanwhile, Lincoln issued orders on April 4 to re-supply Fort Sumter and
notified Anderson of its coming. A demand for surrender was sent to Anderson on the
11th through Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., and Stephen D. Lee, both aides to General
Beauregard. Anderson refused but remarked that he would be starved out within a few
days. Accordingly, Beauregard referred the issue to Secretary of War Walker in
Montgomery. To this Walker replied, “Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter.
If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and
agree that in the mean time he will not use his guns against us…you are authorized thus
to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your
judgment decides to be most practicable.”129 These terms were carried to Anderson soon
after midnight on April 12. He agreed to “evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th
instant” and pledged not to fire on South Carolina forces “unless compelled to do so by
some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my Government.” However, Anderson also
stated he would only evacuate “should I not receive prior to that time controlling
instructions from my Government or additional supplies.”130
These last two words struck a raw nerve and were regarded as unsatisfactory.
Chesnut informed Anderson “we have the honor to notify you that he [Beauregard] will
open fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time.”131 At 4:30 am on
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April 12 the first shot was fired on Fort Sumter from Fort Johnson on James Island.
Anderson soon surrendered, the people of Charleston celebrated, and Governor Pickens
used the occasion to reassure his doubters that the situation had required “exact
calculation, and high science.” When South Carolina was prepared, Pickens added, “I
was ready to strike the blow for my State and the independence of my country…even if it
led to blood and ruin. Thank God the day has come- thank God the war is open, and we
will conquer or perish.”132
Pickens’s enthusiasm was matched by most South Carolinians, especially the
press. According to Cauthen, a majority of citizens still did not think war would even
come. Hammond thought coercion would not occur if as many as two states seceded, let
alone after seven states had formed a confederacy. Armistead Burt of Abbeville vowed to
drink all the blood spilt as a result of secession. The Mercury was confident that any
aggression from the North would only unite the South and make conquest impossible.
Once the slaveholding states were united together, thought the Mercury, “the South is
invincible.” It predicted some future hostility at Fort Pickens in Florida and admitted the
likelihood of a blockade, “But a campaign war- a war of invasion for conquest, by the
North against the South, we do not expect to see…in our judgment, it will never take
place.” If the educated leaders of South Carolina thought a war would not occur,
according to Cauthen, the “masses of the people must have been even less aware of the
danger of war. Led by public men to believe disunion could be peaceably effected, they
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seem to have been carried along on a wave of popular excitement without realizing the
consequences.”133
Those South Carolinians who did anticipate a war would come surely thought it
would not last for an extended period of time. In the excitement of those first months of
war there was little trouble rallying men to military service. After the fall of Fort Sumter,
President Davis’s call for 8,000 men from South Carolina to serve in the Confederate
provisional army for twelve months was quickly met. By June 30 Davis was calling on
the state for an additional 3,000 men to serve for the duration of the war. Although the
response was somewhat less eager, the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th South Carolina Volunteers
were organized and mustered into Confederate service for the duration. Most of these
troops were sent to Virginia in the first year of the war.134 There seems to have been little
opposition at first to the sending of South Carolina troops out of the state. Pickens cannot
be charged with a lack of foresight regarding home defense in the first months of the war.
The same day Davis issued his call for men to serve for the duration, Pickens wrote
Secretary of War Walker asking if “I may order back immediately some of the regiments
I have sent to Virginia for the defense of our coast” in the event of a federal attack that
fall. Pickens understood that South Carolina’s “sea-coast is extensive and quite exposed,”
but added that if he could only be assured of plenty of arms and ammunition he could
“defend the country or make it not worth conquering.”135
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Despite Pickens’s efforts at maintaining home defense, general indignation
towards the Governor’s leadership mounted throughout 1861 as many of the state’s
important leaders thought Pickens was mishandling the crisis over Fort Sumter and not
doing enough to protect the state. As early as January 14 Trescot was writing to Howell
Cobb complaining of Governor Pickens’s “blunders.”136 Several weeks later Henry
William Ravenel recorded in his diary, “There is great dissatisfaction prevailing in the
city at the course of Gov. Pickens.” Ravenel found the governor to be “overbearing,
haughty & rude.” Moreover, his personality “caused many resignations & has made
himself so unpopular since his election, that were it not for the critical state of affairs now
existing, he would be called to account & perhaps impeached.” Ravenel blamed the
“Rhett party” for his selection and believed that Pickens “ought never to have been
elected Governor.”137 William Gilmore Simms described Pickens as an “ass.” Simms
believed that “he will drive away from him every decent counselor” because his
leadership “has caused the most infinite degree of blundering and has offended many.”138
Even Wade Hampton, who remained somewhat aloof from state politics since he was
busy fighting the war in Virginia, described Pickens as a “fool.”139 More than anything
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else, those who were critical of Pickens justified their complaints on his mismanagement
of the military situation.
Charges of Pickens favoring the Upstate in regard to military appointments also
appeared. The Marion Star complained that not only had Pickens neglected the Pee Dee
section but his appointment of General Bonham was the “crowning act of injustice.”
Similar expressions were voiced in the Mercury, which complained that the “men who
made the revolution” were not given fair consideration in appointments.140 More
important was the criticism directed at Pickens for inadequately preparing coastal
defenses in the likely event of an attack. Throughout June and July the Mercury
repeatedly urged “efficient organization and immediate preparation” and described the
state’s policy as “timid and inefficient.”141 If a major Union assault did occur along the
South Carolina coast and territory was lost, there could be little doubt as to who would
shoulder the blame. Clearly, Pickens was in a precarious position.
By early November of 1861 South Carolina had sent an impressive number of
men to Virginia. A total of nineteen regiments had been organized with six of them to
serve for the duration. But danger lurked off the South Carolina coast. As previously
mentioned the Mercury sounded several warnings over the summer urging the state
authorities to “turn our eyes from the well-fortified banks of the Potomac to the more
accessible shores of our own State” and reminded its readers “that in the eyes and
thoughts of our enemies South Carolina is the very head and front of this rebellion.”142
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The coast had not entirely been neglected. P.G.T. Beauregard had established plans for
coastal defense in May and ordered the construction of two forts (Walker and
Beauregard) to guard Port Royal Sound. Fort Walker had been under construction by
slave labor on Hilton Head Island throughout the summer and was completed by
September but its armaments were wholly inadequate. Instead of the seven ten-inch
Columbiad rifled cannons that were supposed to arm the fort, only one was ever installed.
The defenders would have make do with old Navy 32 pounders and a handful of smaller
guns which would, for the most part, prove ineffective.143
While the Union fleet was gearing up for an attack on Port Royal the Governor
addressed the General Assembly. His message was not reassuring or encouraging. Rather
than addressing the pressing military situation he recalled the glories of secession and
seemed more concerned with how historians would remember him. Pickens “confidently”
appealed to the future “with the proud consciousness that posterity will exultingly point
to every page of history, as tablets on whose marble surface shall be engraved the record
of our honor unstained, and of our integrity without a blemish.” He went on to inform the
legislature that many troops had already been called into Confederate service, but he
described the present state of South Carolina’s military organization as in “a state of
comparative disorganization.” He closed with a plea that must have confused most of the
sitting members. Pickens urged the legislature to “increase the power and dignity of the
State, through all her administrative offices,” but also asked the members to “adhere
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firmly to all the conservative principles of our Constitution.”144 How the two were
compatible Pickens did not say. Pickens’s speech had no clear message and certainly he
offered no solutions. Two days later Port Royal fell to the Union fleet under Commodore
Samuel F. Dupont.
The battle for Port Royal has been well described by others.145 It suffices to say
the Confederate forces were no match for the Union fleet that captured the forts quite
easily. More important than the battle were the consequences resulting from the Union
victory which had “a catastrophic and immediate effect on slaves and planters alike.”146
Planters fled inland abandoning their plantations and burned large quantities of cotton.
Many tried to take their slaves with them but these efforts were for the most part,
unsuccessful. The slave population was well aware of the situation and was not coaxed
by their masters into believing their predicament would be worse when the Union army
came to occupy the region. When one young slave named Sam heard the sound of the big
guns he thought it was thunder but there was not a cloud in the sky. His mother said to
him “dat ain’t no t’under, dat Yankee come to gib you Freedom.” This was typical of
scenes enacted on nearly every plantation.147 The fall of Port Royal caused serious
disruptions in the master-slave relationship and created general panic among the white
population. It also “threw Charleston into a panic comparable to that of Washington after
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the battle of Manassas.”148 Henry William Ravenel recorded in his journal that there were
“thousands of rumors of traitors among our people,” and that “the people of Charleston
are apprehensive of an attack.”149 The Mercury also reported that the capture of Port
Royal “created great excitement and considerable apprehension” and regretted that the
“two previous months were wasted in doing nothing for our defense.”150 Preston
complained to Chesnut about the “miserable confusion, ignorance” and complete
“inefficiency” of the state government.151 There was a genuine and understandable fear
among many South Carolinians that they were not only vulnerable to Union forces but
also that a slave population on the loose constituted a serious internal threat. Something
needed to be done quickly to calm the civilian population and restore order.
Accordingly, on November 11 Governor Pickens issued a call for volunteers
under a resolution of the legislature which had been in session for the purpose of
choosing presidential electors. Several months earlier the Provisional Confederate
Congress passed a bill “to provide for local defense and special service.”152 The recruits
Governor Pickens called for were to serve under the provisions of that bill which required
mustering into the Confederate service. Unfortunately, the results were disappointing.
Robert E. Lee, who was now in charge of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia,
had appointed Col. John S. Preston to overlook the recruitment of volunteers for that
purpose. After receiving a discouraging letter from Preston on December 3, Lee reported
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to Secretary of War Benjamin that “the only transfers made up to this time are four
companies for twelve-month’s service.” And even for twelve months, the recruiting was
“very languid.” Governor Pickens also admitted “there is great difficultly in enlisting
regulars now.”153
The lack of men volunteering for service was no doubt due to the realization the
war would last much longer than everyone had thought. That the men who volunteered
were supposed to serve for the duration did not help matters. The legislature responded to
the enlistment problem by drastically amending the militia law of 1841. The new law
made all white males between eighteen and forty-five liable to militia duty and required
company muster and drill at least once every other week. It also authorized the governor
to call out any portion of the militia for twelve months service “either in this State or any
of the Confederate States.”154 The legislature greatly strengthened the potential
effectiveness of the militia by this act. But before the measure could be put into place, a
great fire broke out in Charleston burning some 540 acres and 575 private homes. Total
property losses were estimated between $5 million and $8 million.155
The realization of a prolonged war, enemy occupation of Port Royal, the fire in
Charleston, the fear of an imminent attack on that city, the federal blockade off the coast,
rising prices, scarcity of goods, and the problem of enlisting men for the duration of the
war constituted a general and immediate emergency in the eyes of many South
Carolinians. As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, before the convention adjourned
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the previous April it had resolved to dissolve itself by the first day of January 1862 unless
“public exigencies shall require” it to be reassembled at the discretion of the president.
Members of the convention were losing patience with both Pickens and the legislature.
Delegates thought both were moving too slowly to meet the urgent emergency facing the
state. President Jamsion indeed thought this was a general emergency and in accordance
with the power given to him, reassembled that body on the day after Christmas. He
explained the perils of the state are “far graver” than at the time of the convention’s last
adjournment. Jamison cited the Union occupation “of the wealthiest and best part of our
seaboard,” and “a slave population which have come in contact with abolitionism.” He
expressed concern that a great number of the state’s citizens were serving in the field and
as a result the next fall elections “might be suffered to go by default” which would leave
the state “without an organized government.”156 In other words, the current structure of
state government in relation to the emergency facing the state was flaccid. Jamison might
have added the general lack of confidence in Governor Pickens and the legislature to
handle the military crisis as the primary reason for reassembling the convention but
apparently thought it in the state’s best interest to refrain from saying so.
To meet the emergency the convention took drastic action. Convinced that
Governor Pickens and the legislature were inadequate to solve the pressing problems, the
convention created an extraordinary body to strengthen the efficiency and defense of the
state. The creation of an Executive Council by the convention was a radical departure
from previous political practice. It was created out of desperate circumstances to bring
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order and stability to a state that was increasingly experiencing the pangs of war. The
convention ordinance proclaimed “the Governor shall be assisted” by the Executive
Council “in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him.” The council would have
power to declare martial law if required “by the exigency of public affairs” and to “arrest
and detain all disloyal or disaffected persons” if they were deemed “inconsistent with the
public safety.” Moreover, the council could order and enforce the “disposition of private
property” for public use with due compensation from the state and “draw money from the
public Treasury” for “the more efficient execution” of powers given to the body.
Ordinances were passed to “suspend certain parts of the Constitution” and for
“strengthening the Executive Department.” The council would consist of the governor,
lieutenant governor, and three other members chosen by the convention. For all intents
and purposes, the governor was usurped of power since he was merely a member of the
council. This was not simply a cabinet of advisors. A quorum consisting of the lieutenant
governor and two other members of the council could exercise full executive power in the
governor’s absence. In short, the council was given the power to do “whatever else may
be required for the defense of the State” for the “more efficient execution of the powers
hereby confided to them.”157 That the creation of such a body with remarkable powers
heretofore exercised by the governor and legislature was a vote of no confidence in either
to conduct the war can hardly be doubted. The day after the Executive Council was
created Mary Chesnut described it as “a bundle of sticks and crutches for old Pickens.”158
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This convention ordinance is significant because it raised serious questions not
only about South Carolina’s political culture in the midst of war but challenged more
fundamental political values South Carolinians held dear during the antebellum era. Was
centralizing state authority in the hands of five men what the radicals wanted from this
revolution? Was it what moderates had envisioned when they made the decision to
support secession in December of 1860? State politicians sitting in the convention of both
political persuasions had voted for the measure creating the council, the vote being 96 to
23.159 Perhaps the revolution was going in a direction that neither faction had quite
imagined. In the turbulent times of December 1861 little opposition was voiced to such
extraordinary measures. The danger facing the state was so great that constitutional
objections were swept away amid calls for increasing the effectiveness of the executive
department. There were some sputtering concerns on constitutional grounds but these
were minimal and quickly brushed aside.160 Not surprisingly, Governor Pickens sternly
objected to the creation of a body that essentially replaced him as Commander-in-Chief.
Pickens thought he owed it to the convention “to say that I seriously think the ordinance
that you have now passed will, in its practical operation, greatly weaken the Executive as
created by the Constitution.” Pickens expressed his disapproval of Section Eight which
required military orders be submitted to a vote of the council. Pickens feared that any
159
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“unusual or arbitrary power will create suspicion and jealously” and rightfully worried
that the council would produce “great imbecility in acting as Commander-in-Chief.”161
One suspects that limiting Pickens’s authority was the chief objective in creating
the council in the first place. A general lack of confidence in the leadership of Pickens by
the end of 1861 reached a crescendo. Desperate times called for desperate measures.
George Rable has pointed out the consequence was a resort to desperate politics. State
politicians had to confront practical and ideological questions about ends and means. It
was more than a simple conflict between those who advocated a consolidated state and
those who were unwilling to sacrifice states’ rights to military necessity. Rather, “this
new debate marked the beginning of a long contest between a politics of national unity
and a politics of individual, community, and state liberty…To sacrifice liberty in order to
preserve it: this paradox summed up the Confederate dilemma.”162 The creation of an
Executive Council, composed of the South Carolina’s most talented men to take charge
of state affairs, was a response to the trying times. Genuine alarm engulfed the state and
there was agreement that something needed to be done. The creation of an Executive
Council seemed to be a plausible solution. Pickens stated that he would resign if it were
not for the present state of public affairs. In the interest of harmony he pledged to
cooperate with the council and would “cheerfully” execute the ordinance “to the
letter.”163 Whatever personal objections Pickens had to the council, it is doubtful he had
much to be cheerful about at the beginning of 1862.
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If there was any question as to who would assume leadership in the council it was
answered almost immediately. On Chesnut’s motion administrative departments were
created with Chesnut becoming Chief of the Department of the Military. Chesnut was
given “all such powers as are necessary” to perform his duties which included
commanding “all officers and employees in the military organization of the State.” All
appointments to vacancies in the military service of the State “heretofore vested by law in
the Governor, shall be vested in the Chief of the Military Department.”164 Chesnut, not
Pickens, would be calling the shots. Lieutenant Governor Harllee and W.H. Gist became
heads of the Department of Treasury and Finance, and I.W. Hayne Chief of Justice and
Police. Later in the year a Department of Construction and Manufacture was created with
Gist as its head. The Executive Council met for the first time on January 9 and proceeded
with business. Of the five member council, there was a mixture of radical and moderate
behavior during the sectional crisis. The council was not made up of one faction, and
perhaps this shows that the revolution was moving in a direction that neither faction had
anticipated. Although its members could not have known it at the time, the Executive
Council became “the source of the greatest political controversy in the Civil War history
of the state.”165
Why did the council become the source of political controversy? Tentative
answers will be put forth on the following pages. However, it should be pointed out that
the council was charged with nothing less than transforming a predominantly rural and
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agricultural state into one that would be prepared to meet the demands of a prolonged war
that became bloodier with each passing day. Emory Thomas has argued convincingly that
in their quest for independence southerners experienced many transformations resulting
from the demands of war, and by extension, the demands of the Confederate government.
The antebellum “southern way of life” was revolutionized by the Confederate experience.
Thomas explains that “revolutions, even conservative revolutions, contain a dynamic of
their own. They have a way of getting out of hand and transforming even the institutions
they were meant to preserve.”166 This certainly was the case with South Carolina. One
need not look to the Confederate government to find a revolutionary experience. It can be
found at the state level in the actions taken by the Executive Council.
Evidence for the above assertion can readily be found in the measures taken by
the council to improve the sources of supply in the state. The council would transform
South Carolina into a nascent industrial society. Among the most pressing shortages were
lead and powder. To procure more lead Chesnut sought the help of Professor John
LeConte to examine the existing lead mines of the state. LeConte reported that the lead
mine in Spartanburg was rich in ore and easily workable. Therefore, arrangements were
made “to place it for a time in the hands of the State.”167 The mine was operated by the
state with indifferent success until 1863 when it was sold to the Confederacy.168 The
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council urged private donations of lead. In Georgetown the Episcopal, Methodist, and
Baptist Churches all gave their church bells to the state. The town bell was also given.169
The council also experimented with the manufacture of nitre to alleviate the
powder shortage. Although there were saltpetre caves within the limits of the
Confederacy, Chesnut reported “their yield was far short of our necessities.” He thought
there was but one way to supply the deficiency “and that was to produce it ourselves.”
Five acres of land were leased in Columbia by the state for that purpose. It was hoped and
expected that within eight to twelve months at least one thousand pounds of powder
would be produced daily. This would ensure “a sufficient quantity of powder for the
wants of the State, at all times.” The Charleston Courier thought it was “a business so
novel in this country, that no one had any proper knowledge of its details.” The Courier
went on to applaud the experiment that was “driven by necessity” which was “being
conducted on the most extensive scale known in the Confederacy.”170 Mary Chesnut
believed the experiment to be “a brilliant success” and was happy that “Mr. C is proud of
it.”171
In addition to increasing supplies at home the council sought ways to relieve
pressure on the state resulting from the federal blockade. W.H. Gist, head of the
Department of Manufacture and Construction “commenced putting up the necessary
buildings for a foundry and work shops.” Until those buildings were completed
“temporary work shops were established in Columbia for repairing arms.” Old flint and
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steel locks were converted to percussion, bayonets were altered to fit the new guns, and a
large number of pikes were made. A state armory was established in Greenville which
“progressed rapidly.” Many of these state-sponsored projects were for the exclusive use
by South Carolina. Gist considered it “the duty of the State” to “retain the means of
defense, and not give up to any other power whatever all her military material.”
According to Gist’s report, his department had spent some $95,212 by August 1862.172
Other projects were meant to serve the needs of the Confederacy. Vessels, for
example, were constructed for coastal defense and to bolster the diminutive Confederate
Navy. The convention passed an ordinance “Further to provide for the Harbor and Coast
Defenses of the State.” The council was authorized to spend $300,000 “appropriated out
of any moneys in the Treasury of the State” for the construction or purchase of vessels.
By October the gunship Chicora was completed and arrangements were made “to build
two more gun-boats as rapidly as possible.” These vessels were constructed for the
Confederate Navy on the understanding that the state would be reimbursed by the
Richmond government, which it was.173 It can be said with relative certainty that South
Carolina embarked on an extensive program of industrialization and manufacturing
which was a decisive departure from the emphasis on agriculture during the antebellum
era.
Although the council was primarily concerned with military matters, a social
revolution of sorts also occurred. The council took action to alleviate civilian distress.
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The shortage of salt created a serious problem for the civilian population who depended
on the subsistence for the preservation of meat. A proposition was put forth in the
Executive Council chamber “to push forward the manufacture of salt.”174 The state aided
those who were willing to manufacture salt on their own by appropriating $50,000 for a
loan fund.175 To combat the inflation and speculation of salt the council chastised the
profiteers of “unrighteous and unconscientious extortion” who were “daily adding to their
gains by raising their prices upon the necessitous and poor.” A committee was organized
consisting of Pickens, Hayne, and Gist “to consider and report a tariff of prices for
provisions and other necessaries of life.” The council threatened that any violation or
evasion would go “punished.” Although price regulations for salt never went into effect,
the fact that the council debated the issue at all is remarkable.176
Some price regulation did occur, as on the selling of medicine to the various
districts. The price of quinine, for instance was “to be fixed by the Chief of Military.” To
relieve hunger, small amounts of surplus army beef were distributed to civilians free of
cost.177 As a food saving measure the council resolved that it was inexpedient “to grant
any license to distill spirituous liquors from grain,” except to distill exclusively for the
purpose of making alcohol, “a license for which may or may not be hereafter granted.”
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Several weeks earlier the council had resolved to “close all grog shops and prohibit the
sale of all intoxicating drinks in the vicinity of the lines of fortifications.”178
These measures were strictly enforced by Chief of Justice and Police Hayne. One
individual from Pickens District was arrested and placed in jail as well as another from
Union District. Six more persons were later arrested and detained from Pickens District.
In three separate instances Hayne reported that “bar-rooms have been closed, and the key
taken by the Policeman.” Hayne also reported other “public bar-rooms at the termini of
railroads and at railroad stations, have been effectually suppressed.”179 By the end of the
year the council resolved “that in view of the alarming increase in the price of corn and
the threatened scarcity of provisions…the permits hitherto granted to distill grain under
certain restrictions, should be and they are hereby revoked.”180 By shutting down private
businesses, dictating what could be grown on private property, and arresting citizens for
distilling liquor, the council was clearly meddling with South Carolina’s history of
individualism181 and intervening on behalf of the state to increase security and relieve
civilians from the hardships of war.
If an industrial revolution occurred along with a social revolution as a result of the
council’s actions, then surely it can be maintained that a political revolution also gripped
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the state. Although increasing industrial output and maintaining order was essential
business to the council, the council’s most important job was the raising of troops.
Fortunately for the council this unhappy task was made easier by a resolution of the
convention which declared “no part of the militia law shall stand in the way” of the
council to organize and call into service any portion of the militia “in such matter and
under such regulations as may seem most expedient.”182 Apparently, previous legislation
passed by the General Assembly did not seem to concern the convention any longer since
the legislature by this point had ceased to function as the primary law-making body. This
blanket authority was exercised at once by the convention when on February 2 President
Davis called on South Carolina to fill her quota of 18,000 troops to serve in the
Confederate army. Chesnut and Hayne studied the situation, came up “with a scheme of
action” to fill the vacancies, and obtained the views of the Adjutant General (States
Rights Gist).183 An appeal written by Chesnut appeared several weeks later urging the
twelve-month troops in Virginia to re-enlist for the duration and not to leave the field
with the enemy in sight. He asked the troops not to tarnish “the bright crown which now
gleams on your brow” by leaving after their enlistment term expired and to record their
names “on the immortal list” of those who had already resolved to serve “until we shall
conquer an honorable and glorious peace.”184
When the response was less than enthusiastic notice was given that volunteers
would only be accepted until March 20, after which the introduction of a system of state-
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wide conscription would commence. The threat to conscript military-age men across the
state came in advance of the Confederate national Conscription Act which was not
introduced until April of 1862. In this case, South Carolina was quicker than the
Confederate Congress to realize the necessity of conscription. The council also resolved
that “no person not now under orders, subject to military duty, in South Carolina, shall be
permitted to enter Confederate services for a less time than the war.”185 The threat of
conscription worked well. In the eyes of most military age men it was far more honorable
to volunteer than be drafted. A flood of volunteers came pouring in and by March 20 the
council decided to extend the acceptance of volunteers until April 15.186 By April 28,
Chesnut was reporting some 21,914 men in Confederate service for the duration.187 South
Carolina had exceeded the Confederate quota by almost 4,000 men. Interestingly, a
notable feature of the new system was a provision that commissioned officers were to be
appointed by the Executive Council and not elected by the troops. This did harm to the
tradition of grass-roots democracy and individualism that had long characterized the
state.188 Nevertheless, the council appeared to be doing its job well and had not exceeded
the mandate given it by the convention.
The council was instrumental in assisting Confederate authorities to enforce the
national Conscription Act, which was passed by the Confederate Congress on April 14,
1862. President Davis admitted there was “embarrassment from conflict between State
and Confederate legislation,” although he assured the Congress that “entire harmony of
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purpose” continued to exist between him and the executives of the southern states. He
asked Congress “that some plain and simple method” be adopted for the enrollment and
organization of men into Confederate military service by way of a national draft.189 As
many scholars have noted, this was a significant step away from the traditions of states’
rights and individualism characteristic of the antebellum South. The creation of a truly
national army and the draft clearly impinged on the states’ rights doctrine that so many of
the Confederacy’s founders held dear.190 A central government was dictating to the states
the method and procedure for mandatory military service. These men might serve
anywhere in the Confederacy and find themselves far from their home state.
One might reasonably assume that South Carolina, arguably the state with the
most zealous regard for states’ rights and certainly the state which had historically
defended the right of state interposition, would come out strongly against such
centralized legislation. Yet, the opposite occurred. The Executive Council pledged to
waive “all objections to the measure and to give it a cheerful and energetic support upon
the ground of imperious public necessity.”191 The “imperious public necessity” was
another way of saying that the war was not going well. Large sections of the western
Confederacy were already under Union occupation not to mention wealthy strips of land
along the South Carolina coast. The decision to waive all objections to a national draft
was justified because South Carolina politicians were aware that the war could be lost if
something was not done soon to shore up the shortage of manpower. An editorial in the
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Mercury entitled “The President and Conscription- Better Late than Never,” thought the
bill authorizing national conscription “is decidedly a move in the right direction, and
should long since have been taken.” The Mercury was “glad to see any awakenings to the
necessities of the country.”192 Necessity, it seems, became the watchword for those
favoring the measure and growing centralization. But as Thomas has observed, one must
ask how much erosion a political doctrine can sustain and still be a viable war aim.193 It
was, perhaps, a testament to South Carolina’s commitment to the “cause” and an
indication of strong southern nationalism that it accepted these changes and innovations.
Yet, it also demonstrates that South Carolina was willing to give up some aspects of its
cherished devotion to state authority in its bid for independence and quest for security.
There was, of course, some opposition. J.W. Reid, a soldier in the Fourth
Regiment of South Carolina Volunteers, was sure that the conscription bill would pass
because “Jeff Davis recommended it, and it seems that he is a dictator, and that our
Congress will pass any measure that he recommends.” If Congress could constitutionally
force soldiers to remain in the army for three years, what could keep it from forcing
soldiers to remain for ten years wondered Reid. Further, in his view, if the conscription
bill passed Congress, “all patriotism is dead, and the Confederacy will be dead sooner or
later.”194 In some cases outright defiance of the council occurred, as happened in the
fourth division of the militia when a draft of 500 men was called for to defend the
approaches to Georgetown in 1862. Chesnut reported “with pain” that while there were
192
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men in the company “the spirit was wanting.” The draft was eluded by some “who took
to concealment” while others “stood in open defiance of the law.” Those who did submit
to the draft “refused to obey the orders” of General Harllee. Accordingly, the council
adopted swift and stern measures to meet the resistance and several of the “recusants
were seized and put into prison,” while others were summoned “for trial before a Court
Martial.”195
To explain this “unhappy and disgraceful state of affairs” Chesnut blamed “some
leading men” who endeavored “to poison the minds of the people by inculcating the idea
that the authority from which the orders emanated was unconstitutional- that the
Convention of the people of South Carolina was without lawful existence and without
power.”196 These men were encouraged, he said, by “noxious pabulum through the
channels of an uninformed press” and the result was “ignorance, indolence, selfishness”
and “disappointed ambition” which made “coadjutors of Lincoln and all the hosts of
abolition myrmidons.”197 Part of the problem was, as Emory Thomas has observed, that
conscription as practiced by the Confederacy was never what President Davis asked for;
he had wanted “some plain and simple method” of enlisting men. However, amendments
to the Conscription Act and the issue of exemption created not a little trouble for
Confederate and state authorities and confusion and tension between them occurred from
the outset.198 Nevertheless, the incidents Chesnut referred to were relatively few in
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number and the council largely succeeded in its task of raising men for Confederate
service. By the end of August Chesnut reported that there were 42, 973 men in
Confederate service, which was more than one-seventh of the white population of the
state.199
Isolated incidents of opposition to conscription therefore should not be interpreted
as fleeting willpower, lack of morale, or a determination to secure victory. Nor should
one assume that massive resistance to the Confederate government occurred as a result of
conscription. In fact, one historian has said of South Carolina that “no state officially
cooperated more fully with the Confederate government. Passionately devoted to state
rights principles there was nevertheless a disposition, until the very last months of the
war, temporarily to sacrifice these opinions in the interest of harmony and victory.
Though questioning the constitutionality of conscription, South Carolina gave to it her
unprotesting support.” The issue of exemptions, which caused so much trouble in other
southern states, did not create considerable backlash in South Carolina. Political leaders
in South Carolina exercised state power by insisting on the right to exempt certain
classes, especially overseers, but it cannot be said that conscription and exemption
created general disillusionment with the Confederate cause.200
Moreover, by working closely with the Confederate government, the council was
able to advance the interests of South Carolina. But more often the council served the
Confederacy by giving local application and authority to many of the policies emanating
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from the Richmond government. In this way, the Executive Council should be seen as s
strong expression of Confederate nationalism rather than as a body which hindered it. On
most issues the council yielded to the will of the Confederate government and the
concern for internal security superseded objections over state rights. In fact, the council’s
program for defense “served as a shield for the Confederacy and absorbed much of the
criticism which the austerity measures of the Confederacy received in other states.”201 A
system of national conscription, enforced by the Executive Council, did not cause enough
internal dissention to seriously threaten the war effort or the existence of the council
itself.
Such, however, was not the case when the council decided to implement a statewide system for impressing slave labor on various projects of defense. Furnishing slave
labor for coast and harbor defenses proved to be one of the most difficult and volatile
issues the council had to deal with. During the Fort Sumter crisis and throughout the
summer of 1861 planters seemed more than willing to lend their slaves to the state for
defense. By 1862, however, this was no longer the case. Apparently, the legislature of
1861 had debated the issue in secret session and resolved to authorize the governor to
employ slaves “either by arrangement with their masters, or by impressment.” Chesnut
pointed out the 1861 law was “defective in several particulars.” For one, the legislation
“made no attempt at equalization” nor did it contain any “authority for its promulgation.”
Chesnut criticized the legislature for its actions and for meeting in secret session, which
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he considered “a grave error.” He did not mention that the Executive Council also met in
secret session nearly everyday.202
The council acted quickly to resolve the labor shortage. On May 5 1862 Governor
Pickens, with President Davis’s blessing and the approval of the council, exercised the
authority given to him by the convention. Pickens proclaimed that “until further orders,
martial law is hereby established and proclaimed in and over the City of Charleston and
ten miles on all sides beyond the corporate limits thereof.” At the council’s request
Pickens also relinquished considerable power to the Confederate authorities. He gave
“full power and authority” to the Confederate general commanding in South Carolina “to
impress labor of all kinds for public works and defense, in a manner as full and unlimited
as if martial law were therein established and proclaimed.”203 The council did not merely
bow to the will of the Confederate government. It ceded power to the Confederacy
because the council itself was an extension of the central government an acted as an arm
of the convention.
These high-handed measures sparked a storm of protest from the planters in the
areas affected who argued that impressment of slaves was not evenly divided across the
state, and in many cases they refused to hand over their labor force to Confederate
authorities. A steady stream of letters reached the council asking for exemption
throughout the summer.204 Confederate authorities, in turn, complained that requisitions
were not being met and that the shortage of labor was becoming critical. Accordingly, on
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Chesnut’s motion, the council revised the system in late July. The new program adopted
was a state-wide system of impressment that divided the state into four districts with
equal slave populations. Each district was to furnish one-third of all slaves liable for road
duty for one month to Confederate service.205
As might be expected, protests and letters asking for relief continued to pour in.
James Henry Hammond, for example, protested that the impressment of one-third of his
labor force would cost him one-half of his crop.206 More typical of the protests was that
which appeared in the Mercury on August 22 from Abbeville district. Four specific
grievances were listed and the protest was signed by four delegates to the convention. A
plea from the protesters asked if the council might postpone impressment since “the time
of fodder-pulling is near at hand.” A response from Chesnut was printed that same day
and addressed all four grievances listed by the protesters. Chesnut replied that the danger
facing the slaves’ health was far less than the dangers facing the men in the ranks.
Postponement was impracticable since the enemy would not postpone an attack.207 In
some instances there was a sectional aspect to the attacks upon the council. More often
than not these came from the Upstate and centered on impressing slaves for coastal labor,
which the planters in the Upstate said would be dangerously unhealthy. After visiting
“the upper portion of the State,” editors for the Charleston Courier reported that “the
people everywhere seem united in opposition to it and its usurpations of power.” It was
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later said that the convention and council violated “principles” by exercising an
“unscrupulous disregard of political justice to one part of the State.”208
The council officially justified the system since it seemed “under the
circumstances, a necessity.” It was also pointed out by the council that the “same
necessity which justifies the conscription of the white man, justifies the impressment of
the negro.” Further, the council claimed the power to impress “is clearly given” under the
authority of the convention and that the only question which has arisen “was on the
propriety of its exercise.”209 These plausible justifications did not satisfy the planters who
continued to express outrage at the council for impressing their private property.
On the whole, however, there is little evidence that the council abused the
extraordinary powers given it by the convention. Though arrests were made, those
arrested were soon released or freed on bond. The declaration of martial law was within
the limits of power granted to the council and a passport system established in Columbia
lasted for only a brief period of time. In other words, “the council exercised its power
with not only considerable energy and wisdom but with restraint as well.”210
Nevertheless, the legislature would abolish the council in December 1862. An
examination of what led to the council’s downfall will reveal that opposition originated
from deeply held political convictions that began long before the council’s creation. They
involve ideological underpinnings that illustrate South Carolina’s long history of political
factionalism.
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Chapter Four
Sovereignty and the Demise of the Council
It is tempting to attribute the downfall of the council solely to the measures it
passed regarding impressment and conscription. This, however, would be a mistake.
Certainly there was resentment towards the council for these actions and there can be no
question that the council did ruthless violence to the individualism that South Carolinians
had long taken pride in, not to mention the unity and harmony so many politicians had
espoused. Moreover, the burdens imposed by the council came at a time when the
glorious and heroic visions of war were succumbing to the first manifestations of war
weariness. Compulsory military service, shortages from the blockade, rising prices,
heavier taxes imposed by the council, a displaced population of slaveholders and slaves
along the coast and enemy occupation of South Carolina territory, all these things
disrupted normal economic processes and the antebellum social order. These realities
understandably brought discontent and a tendency to blame those in authority. Just as
Pickens was blamed for the setbacks at the end of 1861, the council came to be criticized
for the deteriorating state of affairs throughout 1862. But there was something more
important and complicated behind the resentment of the council. The issue was an
ideological one which had to do with the theoretical question of the sovereign power of
the convention.211
For over thirty years most South Carolinians had accepted Calhoun’s theory that
sovereignty, illimitable and indivisible in nature, was an attribute of the people of the
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state who exercised this sovereignty through a convention chosen by the people. This
theory worked well when it was used against what was considered to be a hostile and
centralized federal government before the Civil War.212 But when it threatened to subject
the state’s citizenry indefinitely to the rule of the convention and council, the people
reacted against it. Cries were heard across the state for a return to “constitutional
government.” The idea that an all powerful council, unaccountable to the people because
it was itself the people, broke down when the war jeopardized the normal functioning of
government. Political divisions which had long been a part of the state’s history
reappeared. In short, “the old clash of opinion between secessionists and nationalists over
state sovereignty and the sovereign convention was heard once again like an ironical echo
from that earlier, happier day.”213 The factionalism that had created so much political
tension in the decade before the war now threatened to re-emerge in the midst of war.
Chesnut, Hayne, and Gist had served South Carolina faithfully long before the secession
crisis. While their integrity was beyond the shadow of a doubt, now “they suddenly found
themselves confronting a storm of misrepresentation and abuse probably unparalleled in
the history of the state.”214
The first murmurings against the council appeared as early as January 1862, and,
not coincidently, they occurred in Edgefield, the hometown of Governor Pickens. It was
rumored that the convention, by creating the council, was intended as a slur upon the
Governor. If this was true, said the Edgefield Advertiser, it would be “detestable and
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contemptible, in a sovereign body like this to seek thus cruelly to wound the reputation of
a patriotic public servant.” More to the point, if this was indeed the purpose in creating
the council, it was to be “regretted” that the convention “did not cease to exist with the
close of the previous session.”215 Less than a month after it reassembled, there were
already calls being made that the convention should have dissolved itself. In some
instances the criticism directed against the council should have been against Pickens
himself. For example, it was he who had introduced a resolution for a census of gold and
silver plate preparatory to impressment for establishing a currency. Popular reaction
against such a measure was so strong that it was immediately revoked, but it was the
council, not Pickens, who got the criticism. Ironically, in fact, it was this resolution
offered by Pickens that may have started a general campaign against the council.216
A mass meeting was held in Edgefield on April 9 where resolutions were passed
criticizing the convention for creating the council and for continuing its own existence. It
called upon the Edgefield delegates to the convention to repeal the ordinance that created
the council and asked other districts to call similar meetings for that purpose. Later that
month a petition with over seven hundred names appeared in the Charleston Mercury
calling on the delegates from St. Philip and St. Michael’s Parishes to dissolve the
convention and the council so that the state government would return to “the rightful
operation of the Constitution.”217 Similar meetings were held in the Marion district where
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“a large and respectable” crowd gathered “for the purpose of dissolving the Executive
Council” and expressed its hope that the convention would adjourn “sine die.”218 Other
citizens complained that the council members “receive large salaries” while the “the
people” were “overwhelmed by taxation and bleeding at every pore.” Charges of this sort
were easily made but more common were the constitutional objections. The same citizen
who complained about the salaries also stated that “The people are united in opposition to
it. It is universally admitted to be an illegal and unconstitutional oligarchy.”219
Charges of this nature not only threatened the existence of the council but raised
fundamental questions about the political culture of South Carolina. As George Rable has
observed, part of the problem was that “few precedents for limiting the powers of the
secession conventions existed because antebellum constitutional conventions in the
Southern states had routinely exceeded their delegated authority.” Moreover, “in a
republic-as opposed to a democracy based on “tyranny” of mere numbers-there was no
precedent restricting the authority of a sovereign convention.”220 For the most part,
objections were made on the ground that the council “usurped legislative powers, never
designed to be conferred on it.” The council, the Courier complained, seemed to operate
under the assumption that “We are the State.” Every “attempt to legislate is an
assumption of authority on the part of the Council.”221 In other words, the charge was
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made that the council was exercising legislative as well as executive authority, thereby
diluting the theory of the separation of powers.
Meeting in secret session, the council was considered by many to be an arbitrary
and irresponsible body that threatened the liberties of the people. The editorials in the
Charleston Courier were relentless in their attacks on the council. It was described as an
“odious despotism,” a “Lilliputian Lincolnism,” and its members “usurpers and tyrants.”
Moreover, claims were made that the council was creating “dissension and discord
among a people hitherto united and harmonious” and it was an unnecessary body since
“The Executive Council has proved a dead failure.” In short, it was “a snake which ought
to be both scotched and killed.”222 What accounts for these vicious attacks on the
council? As indicated earlier, a good bit of the political factionalism that existed in the
decade before the war had now made its way back into South Carolina politics during the
war. The factionalism had been reshaped but was essentially what it had been during the
sectional crisis.
The factional divisions that occurred as result of the debate over the council’s
existence were not as clear cut as they had been during the sectional crisis in the years
leading up to the Civil War. Cooperationists and separate state actionists did not
disappear but they were less visible, no doubt due to the interest of harmony. Still, one
can discern lingering factions on the question of the council. The Courier, which had
been the organ for the National Democrats and cooperationists before the war (and
denounced by the radicals for its heresy) came out against the council more strongly than
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any other newspaper in the state.223 This was not a coincidence. Lashing out at former
political enemies the Courier proclaimed, “We differ widely from the prevalent opinion
in this State, as to the character and office of Conventions.” The general opinion in the
state, said the Courier, is that conventions are the people acting in their highest sovereign
capacity and are possessed of supreme and absolute power. “We repudiate such a
doctrine or theory, as slavish and utterly at war with every principle of Republican
Government.” Instead, the “true theory” of conventions, it wrote, is that they are “not the
people in the exercise of their highest sovereignty” but rather, “extraordinary delegates”
who assembled for “extraordinary occasions” to discharge the functions or perform acts
to which the ordinary departments of governments “are incompetent, inadequate, or
unsuited.”224 This was a clear denunciation of Calhoun’s theory and a direct attack on the
radicals who espoused it.
On July 1 the Courier asked several important questions that struck at the heart of
South Carolina’s political tradition. “By what right does the Convention assume to
govern the State? By what right does it undertake to supersede the Chief Executive,
virtually suspend the Courts, abrogate law, interfere with private rights, issue orders to
tax collectors, appoint salaried officers, thrust aside, in a word, the whole constitutional
Government of the State, and erect itself into a despotism, irresponsible and unlimited as
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to duration or extent of power?”225 Radicals and those defending the council had a ready
response. The Mercury replied that “there is a need of all the capacity and activity of the
State” since the danger facing South Carolina was still immediate and great. In any case,
it argued, the sovereignty “of the State of South Carolina does not reside in the
Legislature; for that branch of government, as well as the Judicial and Executive
branches, is only an agency of the true sovereign.” Therefore, the “supreme power was
and is the Convention of the People of South Carolina, whose authority is absolute and
illimitable, in point of time as well as subject matter.” When the Courier accused the
Mercury of inconsistency for opposing secret sessions of the Confederate Congress yet
endorsing them for the Executive Council, the Mercury explained, “There is great
difference between an Executive Council and a Legislative Congress.” The former was
“an aid to the Executive” while the latter was “a deliberative legislative body, with a
constituency directly of the people, and a responsibility to them.” The convention “had a
right to try to strengthen the Executive Department” and thought “no great harm has been
done.” The Mercury claimed it had no disposition to get involved in the debate but “when
the right of the Convention is attacked, and that body is denounced and its immediate
dissolution demanded, we deem it our business to speak plainly and strongly.”226
Defenders of the council said the convention could not be guilty of usurpation
since the people could not usurp power from themselves. Nor was the convention guilty
of assuming legislative power since it possessed all power. To the charge that the
convention superseded its authority by encroaching on the executive, convention
225
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supporters said it was a necessary measure because of Governor Pickens’s “lamentable
inertness” and the lack of wisdom displayed by the legislature in 1861. Still, the questions
raised by the Courier were not easily answered, for as Cauthen explains, “there were
many shades of opinion as to the exact status and powers of the convention.”227 With so
many shades of opinion it’s no wonder that Mary Chesnut thought “We are so busy
fighting each other…Never mind Yankees-until they have exterminated the council.”228
That political factionalism and political tension mounted as a result of the issue is evident
and once the debate started, it “tended of course to reach out to all the old differences.”229
The metaphysical arguments over Calhoun’s theory were important, but they
were too complicated for the average South Carolinian who resented the council. Most
did not care to question the secession theory put forth by Calhoun nor were they overly
concerned with fine constitutional points. By the fall of 1862 the people of South
Carolina were tired of the council and the convention. There was even talk of calling
another convention for the purpose of dissolving the old one. The Mercury warned such
an act would constitute revolution in the midst of a revolution and the people who made
the revolution of 1860 would not submit to counter-revolution. One might reasonably ask
if the actions taken by the council were revolutionary itself. Clearly, an internal
revolution in state politics had occurred from the convention’s ordinance creating the
council, which had been justified under the auspice of “imperious public necessity.” Still,
there seemed to be general agreement that the council and convention must go on the
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grounds that the council was causing too much internal political division. A convention
was a representative body which was responsible to the people. It was elected for a single
purpose, to form or change a government. That had been accomplished with secession
and the ratification of the Permanent Confederate Constitution. The convention’s duty,
then, was to meet as soon as possible to end both the council and itself.230
This debate over the council seriously exacerbated political divisions in a state
that prided itself on harmony. There were personal rivalries within the council itself. Less
than one month after the council’s creation Mary Chesnut already thought it “evident
there will be no concord among them.”231 Chesnut and Pickens, for example, rarely
agreed on military strategy. A look at the Executive Council Journal reveals the two men
disagreeing in the chamber on a weekly basis over war policy and mobilization. Some of
the personal rivalries among the state’s politicians had begun long before the war.
Political cliques that were formed before the war reappeared either in support or
opposition of the council. This was exactly the kind of danger that South Carolina’s
leading men wanted to avoid. There were many politicians who emphasized the need for
unity and an end to traditional political divisions and the debate over an Executive
Council was obviously obstructing this goal. President Jamison, however, made no move
to call the convention back into session and it was difficult for the anti-council faction to
get the required twenty signatures to reassemble the convention. By the end of August,
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however, the twentieth signature had been secured and Jamision was forced to call the
convention back into session on September 9.232
When the convention assembled in September the campaign against the council
was at its height. The newspaper war between the Courier and Mercury had reached a
crescendo at this point, with each accusing the other of inconsistency.233 When Judge
Magrath vacated his convention seat, John Phillips was elected to the convention to
replace the vacancy. Phillips ran on a staunchly anti-convention platform and considered
it his mandate to bring the convention to a speedy end.234 The convention would come to
an end, it turned out, but not as quickly as some hoped. The convention closely examined
the council’s actions over the previous nine months. Pickens promptly made a report to
the convention. A record book kept by the council along with reports from the heads of
different departments and all military correspondence was submitted to the convention
for review. Pickens used the opportunity to state that he was “uninformed in regard to the
entire objects and purposes to be effected by the Convention in creating this Executive
Council” and therefore was “not responsible for many measures.” Hayne’s report,
however, contrasted sharply with Pickens’s. He was quick to point out that “Among the
first measures in assertion of the extraordinary powers conferred, was the proposition
contemplating the seizure of silver plate for the use of the State, introduced by your
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Excellency” and he called attention to a plethora of other resolutions offered by Pickens
which had created resentment in the state.235
The various reports was submitted to a committee of twenty-one which
examined them closely. After careful consideration, Robert W. Barnwell made the final
report. The committee “discovered nothing in the proceedings of the Governor and
Council which seems to them to require any special action on the part of the Convention
in the way of repeal, modification, or animadversion.” The duties of the council, which
grew “out of the exigencies of public affairs,” were discharged, he noted, with “signal
diligence, ability, and success…with an exclusive regard to the public welfare.”
Moreover, the members of the council had, he said, devoted themselves “at great personal
sacrifice” to meet the “extraordinary demands” which the “peculiar condition of the
State” required. After reviewing the reports, the convention was “deeply impressed with
the conviction that the ordinary powers of the Executive would have been entirely
inadequate” to meet “the exigencies of the times.”236 This report was adopted by the
convention without any modifications.
Opponents of the council became dismayed by these reports and acted quickly
to dissolve the convention and council. John Phillips moved to dissolve the convention
and repeal all measures of the council “except such as the Governor may deem necessary
to the safety of the State.” The council’s defenders could easily point out that nearly all
the measures adopted by the council were necessary to the safety of the state.
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Nevertheless, several amendments appeared which sparked a short but serious debate.
Former Governor Richardson, who opposed the continuance of the convention, thought
the council was placed “too high on the dizzy pinnacle of power” and doubted “if
Robespierre, Danton, or even Napoleon, ever exercised more supreme power.” At the
other extreme, Barnwell declared “We are the people, and they are supreme.” He
wondered “How can the people abuse or transcend the power of the people?” Acting on
that premise, Barnwell asked the convention not to “quail before the popular clamor, but
remain at our posts and do our duty to the country, regardless of the consequences.”237
Barnwell was not a hot-headed radical politician of the Rhett type. His old age
and wisdom enjoyed great respect from members of the convention and throughout the
state. If anything, his statement reveals a deep commitment to Confederate nationalism.
But even his influence was not enough to keep the convention from dissolving itself. As
for Rhett himself, he seems to have taken little part in the debate on the council. Instead,
he was still busy offering resolutions in the convention to amend the Confederate
Constitution.238 The revolution had not gone according to Rhett’s vision. He remained so
occupied with denouncing the Confederate government that he never seems to have
realized that a political revolution had occurred in his own state. The council was a
decisive departure from the antebellum political order and the structure of state
government had drastically changed. The executive, which had been so weak for nearly
all of South Carolina’s history, had become the most powerful entity in the state. But if
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the revolution did not unfold according to Rhett’s vision, it hardly moved in a direction
the moderates had anticipated either. As we have seen, the Courier was the fiercest
opponent of the council and its actions even though it had been the voice of moderation
during the sectional crisis. The political revolution that occurred once South Carolina
embarked on its course of independence moved in a direction neither faction had
foreseen. The debate over the council continued the contest between those who would
sacrifice individual liberty for the sake of independence and those libertarian dissenters
who would not yield on principle for the sake of victory. The Executive Council
controversy is therefore an excellent example of that long-running debate that plagued so
many Confederate politicians.
Many members of the convention accepted the creation of the council as
justified to meet the emergency of the times, but with the passage of the Confederate
Conscription Acts they believed the situation had now changed and there was a general
feeling that the council was less indispensable. The Confederate government was still
centralizing power but the more important question revolved around what to do with the
convention. Popular agitation had so distracted the state that dissolving the convention
seemed to be the only solution.239 Accordingly, it was agreed that “the General Assembly
shall have authority to review, repeal or modify such proceedings of the Governor and
Council, or any of them, as to it shall seem proper.” The fate of the council would be left
to the legislature and an amendment offered by Inglis was adopted that specified that the
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“Convention shall cease and be dissolved” on December 17, exactly two years after its
original organization.240
The legislature had not been in session since December of 1861. At its last
session the legislature had passed “An Act creating a Military Establishment for the State
of South Carolina, and for other purposes.” Now the legislature would consider the fate
of the council and its actions would result in the passing of the radicals from power.
When the convention adjourned on September 17 the elections to the legislature were
only a few weeks away. Probably the foremost issue of the campaign was the existence of
the Executive Council but it is difficult to say with precision since the elections received
very little coverage in the press. Some coverage of the issue did appear however. For
example, an article in the Charleston Courier entitled “Our Next Legislature-The
Executive Council” asked South Carolinians “to choose such members for that body as
would pledge to relieve them from the grievance of the Executive Council by the
impeachment of that anomalous Dictatorship at the next session of the Legislature.” The
article went on to stress the importance of the election since the “imbecile and
vascillating” council had caused a “civil revolution.” Another citizen expressed his hope
in the Mercury that the next legislature would “dethrone” the council.241
Inflammatory articles like these were rare, however. More common of the
newspaper coverage was that of the Edgefield Advertiser, which did not speak to the
issue of the Executive Council, but instead, advised that “care should be taken that only
those who can be spared from the army should be elected to legislate for us. We are
240
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infinitely more in want of Soldiers than Legislators.” The Advertiser pledged to support
“only those who are legally and physically exempt from military duty.”242 Similar articles
were printed around the state. In Spartanburg, for instance, William M. Foster was
endorsed as a candidate because he “sealed his devotion to his principles, and his
country’s rights in the battle-field with his blood.” Foster had received a wound at Seven
Pines “which incapacitates him from further service in the field-but his devotion to the
cause of freedom is as warm as ever.”243 Patriotic duty and virtue were achieved by
serving in the military and in most cases this was enough to qualify as a candidate for the
legislature. One historian has observed that this qualification for office is perhaps an
indication of the essential nationalism of the people, as Confederate nationalism was tied
to military service.244
Whatever the exact qualifications were, there can be doubt that the results of the
election indicated a rejection of the old leadership in that there were many new faces in
the legislature. William Gilmore Simms wrote to Hammond that there were some ninetysix new members “each eager to fire his pop gun” at the convention and council.245 In his
address to the General Assembly in November Governor Pickens criticized the
convention for its “remarkable experiment” in government. Claiming that “the
Constitution was grossly and needlessly violated,” he asked that the General Assembly,
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“as the guardians of the Constitution and Law… restore to the State the regular and
ordinary Government.”246
Pickens need not have worried as several resolutions passed condemning the
actions of the convention and council. The General Assembly resolved that it felt an
“unabated respect and affection for our State Constitution,” that it still felt the separation
of powers “as fundamental and necessary” to the existence of the constitution, that any
attempts to set aside that distinction “should be regarded as mischievous,” and that
conventions should only be called for important organic changes “and not to conduct the
Government of the State.” Finally it expressed regret at any measures “which may have
been adopted by the late Convention at variance with these principles.”247 On December
18 the General Assembly passed “An Act to Abolish the Executive Council Established
by the Ordinance of the Convention.” Shortly after this the legislature declared all acts,
proceedings, resolutions, and orders from the Executive Council “have not and shall not
have the force and effect of law.”248 With that act, the tumultuous history of the
convention and Executive Council was over.
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Conclusion
Lacy Ford and Manisha Sinha have contributed greatly to our understanding of
antebellum politics in South Carolina. However, both studies end their analysis when
South Carolina makes its bid for independence. This leaves a gap in the historical record.
Very few studies exist that connect the discourse of South Carolina’s antebellum political
culture to the Civil War. Charles Cauthen’s study, published in 1950, remains the most
comprehensive to this date. Unfortunately, Cauthen did not have the luxury of
incorporating all the historiography that has appeared since that time on the Confederate
experience. Because so many historians have debated the internal struggles, challenges,
and achievements of the Confederate government, the role of South Carolina politics
needs to be reevaluated in light of those studies. This is what I have attempted to do here.
Factional divisions that were so prevalent during the antebellum era did not
simply vanish once South Carolina decided to secede from the Union. It was, ironically,
the factional dispute over the proper method and procedure of secession that contributed
to South Carolina becoming the first state to secede. Once Lincoln was elected President,
the divisions between cooperationists and separate state actionists temporarily faded
away because once cooperation was assured with other southern states, the point became
moot. The leading politicians of South Carolina were well aware of the differences that
were prevalent before the war and they attempted to bury these differences for the sake of
unity and harmony. This effort, however, met with limited success. Disagreement
occurred from the outset over the proper handling of the Charleston forts. South Carolina
certainly did not agree over the nature of the revolution they precipitated.
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The debates that ensued at Montgomery and in the state convention were
lengthy and often bitter. Radical politicians like Robert Barnwell Rhett and Laurence
Keitt could not even agree among themselves over what the new nation was supposed to
be. Obviously there were general agreements that slavery should be constitutionally
protected and that this institution would define the new nation, but there were arguments
over reopening the African Slave Trade, eliminating the three-fifths clause for purposes
of representation, and whether the new southern confederacy should allow nonslaveholding states to join, and their differences caused serious disagreement in the state
convention. Most of the radical program was rejected at Montgomery. The South
Carolina convention agreed that amendments were needed yet they ratified the Permanent
Confederate Constitution anyway. The radicals apparently knew that war was a likely
possibility and seemed willing to temporarily relent on their various demands in order to
be practical, but many were determined to carry their vision of the revolution through to
its fullest manifestation. They were not able to do this and, for their part, the moderates,
ever afraid of the risks and quite aware that revolutions can spin out of control, attempted
to end the revolution quickly for the sake of cooperation with southern states. Yet, an
internal revolution did occur in South Carolina that the moderates and radicals never
anticipated.
When Francis Pickens was elected governor in 1860 as a compromise candidate
it seemed a great way to please both factions. At first his election was applauded and
many citizens in South Carolina thought that he would do a fine job. His personality,
however, was ill-suited for the task at hand, for he was not a man of decisive action and
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his handling of the state’s defenses was perceived as inadequate. When Port Royal fell to
Union forces in November of 1861 there was widespread criticism of his leadership
across the state. The result was a drastic departure from the existing political structure of
the state to meet an emergency that many South Carolinians perceived as immediate and
urgent. The convention therefore was called back into session to find a solution to the
crisis. The result was the creation of an Executive Council to assist the governor exercise
his duties. It was clearly a vote of no confidence in Pickens. The council went about its
work with considerable energy and vigor and succeeded in placing South Carolina on a
more permanent war-footing and did much to prepare the state for a war that lasted
longer than anyone foresaw. Although the council’s actions addressed the pressing
military problems in South Carolina they also created an internal revolution since its
powers and actions marked a departure from the state’s political traditions.
The Executive Council represented a revolutionary experience for South
Carolinians. The council was, as Mary Chesnut observed, “an exigency of the war.”249
The state’s long emphasis on agriculture gave way to industrialism. State-sponsored
projects greatly increased the industrial output of essential war materials. Some of these
projects were meant to serve the state while others served the Confederacy. The council
also acted to relieve civilian distress resulting from the blockade and federal occupation
of large coastal areas. Orders dictating what kind of food could be grown and for what
purposes impinged upon the individualism that South Carolinians valued so highly during
the antebellum era. Those who distilled liquor soon found themselves arrested by the
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police. More fundamentally, the council created a political revolution in the state. For
during the antebellum era the governorship was largely a ceremonial office and power
was vested in the legislature which made most of the political decisions and controlled
state expenditures. The council drastically altered that system by becoming both an
executive and legislative body.
Proponents of the council argued that the convention represented the people in
their highest sovereign capacity and, therefore, whatever actions the council took were
theoretically an expression of the people. Not so said libertarian dissenters. Many of the
cooperationists who were mostly National Democrats during the sectional crisis came out
strongly against the council. They rejected the theory that a state convention was
illimitable in power and duration. To them, the convention was called for the specific
purpose of taking South Carolina out of the Union. It did not have the power to blur the
separation of powers and act both as an executive and legislative body. Opponents of the
council cried out that the state was no longer operating on constitutional principles; the
legislature, they said, was the true sovereign body of the state. This argument appealed to
many South Carolinians who could easily relate to the political culture they had known
for so long and, in the end, the council was abolished because a majority of South
Carolinians were unwilling to submit indefinitely to the council’s rule.
However, there was little evidence in any of the newspapers or personal
correspondence that indicates a lack of willpower to carry the war through until victory
and independence was won. Discontent with the council should not therefore be seen as
fleeting morale in the Palmetto State. South Carolina citizens wanted to win the war, but
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they wanted to win it under a functioning state constitution. There were limits to how far
South Carolinians were willing to go in order to secure victory. Many thought that the
council had done little to improve the state, while others thought the council had
succeeded in its task of placing South Carolina on a more permanent war footing. The
real point, regardless of individual perception, was that the entire experiment was clearly
something novel in the state. Gary Gallagher has said “the time is ripe to consider the
more complex and fruitful question of why white southerners fought as long as they
did.”250 I would suggest that one plausible answer can be found in South Carolina’s
experiment with the Executive Council. If South Carolina politicians had not been willing
to sacrifice any of their political values then it is quite probable the state would not have
been in a position to carry out a protracted war. One reason why South Carolinians fought
as long as they did was because the Executive Council made it possible to continue
fighting for the duration. The South Carolina Executive Council should be seen as a
strong expression of determination and willpower to secure victory. The mere creation
and existence of the council reveals that South Carolina politicians and citizens were
willing to temporarily sacrifice some their economic, social, and political culture in order
that they might achieve independence.
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